TELKOM
NIKA Indonesia
n
Journal of
Electrical En
gineering
Vol. 12, No. 9, September
2014, pp. 65
3
4
~ 654
3
DOI: 10.115
9
1
/telkomni
ka.
v
12i9.497
3
6534
Re
cei
v
ed O
c
t
ober 2
8
, 201
3; Revi
se
d Apr 28, 201
4; Acce
pted Jun
e
14, 2014
A Research on Profit Allocation of the Wind and Other
Powers’ Bundled Transmission
Herui Cui*, Peng
y
u
Zhang
Dep
a
rtment of Econom
ics an
d Mana
gem
ent
, Nort
h Chin
a Electric Po
w
e
r Univers
i
t
y
, C
h
i
n
a
*Corres
p
o
ndi
n
g
author, em
ail
:
cuiheru
i
19
67
@12
6
.com
A
b
st
r
a
ct
T
he l
a
ck of
w
i
nd
pow
er
’
s
as
similativ
e
c
apa
city has
b
e
co
me
a
bottl
enec
k of w
i
nd
p
o
w
e
r
’
s
larg
e-scal
e
dev
elo
p
m
ent
in
th
e future,
w
h
ile
t
he
bu
ndl
ed
tra
n
smissio
n
mod
e
l
of w
i
nd
p
o
w
e
r is
hi
gh
ly
reco
mme
nde
d
by
many sc
h
o
lars
at pres
e
n
t. Ho
w
e
ver, due to
the
dis
t
emp
e
re
dn
ess of Chi
na'
s
current fisca
l p
o
licy, the
invo
l
v
ed p
a
rties ca
nnot
g
e
t the c
o
rresp
ond
in
g
policy
inc
entiv
es an
d the
econ
o
m
ic co
mpens
atio
n for
add
ition
a
l c
ont
ributi
ons, w
h
ic
h restricted th
e i
m
pl
e
m
e
n
tati
on of the
bun
dle
d
trans
miss
ion
mo
del
. By discussin
g
the bas
ic th
eory of DEA Game, T
h
is p
aper b
u
ilt an
excess profit a
llocati
on
mo
del
based o
n
DE
A Game, an
d took an ex
a
m
pl
e to analy
z
e th
e mo
del
’
s
feasib
ility. Thu
s
, it prov
id
es
so
me
the
o
re
tical
basis
for
the
distri
buti
on
a
m
ou
nt a
nd
practic
e
distrib
u
tion
for
m
s
of the
exc
e
ss profits, a
n
d
pr
o
pos
es a
soluti
on to
the
prob
le
m
of th
e bu
nd
led
transmissio
n
mode
l
’
s be
nefit d
i
stributi
on.
Ke
y
w
ords
:
DE
A ga
me, w
i
nd pow
er dig
e
stio
n, w
i
nd
pow
er trans
missi
on, pr
ofit apporti
on
ment
Copy
right
©
2014 In
stitu
t
e o
f
Ad
van
ced
En
g
i
n
eerin
g and
Scien
ce. All
rig
h
t
s reser
ve
d
.
1. Introduc
tion
Curre
n
tly, the
lack of wind
power’
s
co
nsum
ptive cap
a
c
ity has be
co
me the bottleneck of
wind power
developm
ent, so
the
utilization rate of
many
wind
turbines is
less than 30%.
Therefore, to
pro
m
ote th
e win
d
p
o
wer la
rge
-
scal
e develo
p
me
nt in China,
we
mu
st take
measures to
promote the
wind po
wer’
s co
nsumpt
ive capa
city of powe
r
grid [
1
]. Liu Qi, th
e
Dep
u
ty Secretary of National En
ergy
Board,
m
ade
an imp
o
rta
n
t
spee
ch
in
wind
po
wer
grid
con
n
e
c
tion a
nd market co
nsum
ption st
udy meeti
ng, whi
c
h was o
r
gani
zed an
d held by Natio
nal
Energy Boa
r
d in Beijing i
n
March 3
0
, 2010: the d
e
v
elopment of
wind p
o
we
r and othe
r n
e
w
energy indu
st
ry is the m
a
jo
r strategi
c task in
Chin
a, st
rength
enin
g
the
coordinate
d
develo
p
me
nt
of powe
r
g
r
i
d
and
wind
powe
r
is i
m
porta
nt
foundation fo
r the win
d
po
wer l
a
rg
e-scale
developm
ent, and the re
se
arch on wi
nd
power g
r
id an
d market co
n
s
umptio
n is the top prio
rity.
In orde
r to expand the ab
sorptive ca
pa
city of
wind po
wer, the litera
t
ure [2-3] is referred
to the
use o
f
bundl
ed t
r
a
n
smi
ssi
on
m
odel
of wi
nd
po
we
r, in
o
r
de
r to
expa
nd
wind
po
wer
consum
ptive
regions and i
m
prove grid
stability,
and studies have shown
that
t
h
is approach
is
sci
entific and
feasibl
e
.
Bai Jian
hua
et
al pointed
out in
“the
re
se
arch on
majo
r i
s
sue
s
of Chin
a’s
wind power developm
ent
dissolved
and transmi
s
si
on”: the adjust
ment ability
of other power
(fire, hydro, e
t
c.) is the mo
st importa
nt fa
ctor to dete
r
mine po
wer
system accom
m
odated
win
d
power
scale;
con
c
e
n
trate
d
distri
bution
and d
e
velo
ping of
wind
energy re
source
s in
China
determi
ne
s that we must constr
uct a strong cro
s
s-int
e
rconn
ecte
d grid, to achi
e
v
e China'
s large-
scale win
d
p
o
we
r develo
p
m
ent and utili
zation [4]. Therefo
r
e, t
h
e
bundl
ed tran
smissio
n
mo
del
o
f
w
i
n
d
p
o
w
e
r
re
quires
e
ffective
coo
r
d
i
nation
bet
we
en other typ
e
s of po
we
r and po
we
r g
r
id
group, to provide ancillary
se
rvices; bundled proport
i
on of wi
nd power,
peaki
ng
capacity of
thermal po
we
r
and hydrop
owe
r
,
output cha
r
a
c
teri
stics of wi
nd p
o
w
er, a
nd lo
n
g
-di
s
tan
c
e p
o
w
er
transmissio
n are related to
the depth of re
ceiving en
d
powe
r
pea
ki
ng and oth
e
r
factors.
Curre
n
tly, so
me othe
r fiscal poli
c
y rel
a
ted to
wind
po
wer con
s
train
t
s the im
plem
entation
o
f
bundle
d
transmi
ssion
model of win
d
power,
Z
h
a
n
g
Y
u
n
z
hou
mentione
d the main issue
s
i
n
“the re
sea
r
ch
on majo
r issue
s
of Ch
ina's
wi
nd
p
o
we
r d
e
velo
pment a
nd
consumption
”
:
at
pre
s
ent, the
sub
s
idy
stan
dard
s
of
pre
s
crib
ed g
r
id i
s
low, the
r
e i
s
no relevant
policy for l
a
rge-
scale wi
nd p
o
we
r ba
se o
f
long-di
stan
ce po
we
r
tra
n
smi
ssi
on p
r
oject inve
stm
ent re
covery,
a
variety of auxiliary servi
c
es pr
ovided by other
po
wer
plants and power grid
after the large-scale
grid
-conn
ecte
d of wi
nd
po
wer a
r
e n
o
t p
r
icin
g a
nd
rei
m
bursem
ent
mech
ani
sm
s
[5]. Therefo
r
e
,
to
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
TELKOM
NIKA
ISSN:
2302-4
046
A Rese
arch o
n
Profit Allocation of the Wind a
nd Oth
e
r Powers
’
Bundle
d
… (He
r
ui Cui
)
6535
smoothly
ca
rry out the win
d
po
wer
and
other type
s of
power b
undl
ed tran
sm
i
s
si
on, these issues
must be
re
solved, and o
t
her fiscal p
o
licy rel
a
ted
wind p
o
wer must be
su
ppleme
n
ted
and
improve
d
.
T
h
u
s
,
i
n
o
r
d
e
r
t
o
s
m
o
o
t
h
l
y
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
t
he
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
o
f
bundl
ed
t
r
a
n
smi
ssi
on
m
odel
of
w
i
n
d
p
o
w
e
r
,
we mu
st sol
v
e the probl
e
m
of incom
e
distrib
u
tion, that is, its pa
rticipa
n
ts - th
e
regio
n
'
s
hydropo
wer, th
ermal po
we
r, pumpe
d storage
p
o
wer gene
ration, nucl
ear
po
wer,
bioma
s
s po
wer g
ene
ration
and
gri
d
e
n
terp
rises,
hav
e a
c
cess to
approp
riate
compen
satio
n
, in
orde
r to moti
vate its better co-ordi
nation
of th
is measure
s
to achie
v
e the ability to expand wi
nd
power
d
i
g
e
s
t
i
o
n
pu
rp
oses. This
arti
cle i
s
to
use
the
DEA gam
e m
odel to
solve
the problem
of
benefit di
strib
u
tion of
ea
ch
partici
pant i
n
bundl
ed tran
smissio
n
of
wind
po
we
r,
s
o
a
s
t
o
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
a basi
s
for
co
untrie
s
to est
ablish co
rres
pondi
ng com
pen
sation a
n
d ince
ntive mech
ani
sms.
2. DEA Gam
e
Theor
y
Na
kab
a
yashi and
Tone
(2006
) exten
d
ed the
efficie
n
cy an
alysi
s
of multiplaye
r gam
e
from Gol
any
and
Rou
s
sea
u
(1
992
) [6], that is,
they con
d
u
c
ted
att
r
ibute cla
s
sification on DM
U
throug
h an a
lliance betwe
en DM
U, co
nsid
ere
d
co
o
perative ga
m
e
betwe
en DMU, esta
blished
the DEA Ga
me model, a
nd pion
eered
the applied
resea
r
ch of DEA game.
Neverth
e
le
ss,
the
appli
c
ation o
f
DEA Game wa
s still limited, beca
u
se
Na
kab
a
y
ashi an
d T
one (2
006
)
[7]
con
s
id
ere
d
that the num
ber of pl
ayers an
d
the standa
rd wa
s gene
rally
le
ss,
and on
ce this
numbe
r exp
a
nded, it will i
n
crea
se th
e
difficulty of
solving the g
a
m
e solution.
Therefore,
ho
w to
desi
gn a rea
s
on
able al
go
rithm to solv
e this p
r
oble
m
is worth
studying. Li Yo
ngjun a
nd Li
ang
Liang
et al
(2
008, 2
009
) [8
, 9] co
nsi
dere
d
the
fixed
co
st allo
catio
n
probl
em
s bet
wee
n
a
num
b
e
r
of DM
U
ba
se
d on
DEA
an
d lea
gue
ga
me, an
d d
e
si
gned
two
alg
o
rithm
s
of
lin
ear prog
ram
m
ing
and ge
netic i
nherita
n
ce to solve this p
r
o
b
lem.
DEA Game
model m
a
inly con
s
id
ers ho
w
to re
ach a
n
agreem
ent
betwe
en ma
n
y
people
unde
r th
e
co
ntext of multi
-
stan
da
rd. A
s
sumin
g
n
pl
a
y
ers, ea
ch wi
th
m kind
s
of
stan
da
rd,
a
n
d
jointly allocati
ng vested int
e
re
st. Due to
self-inte
r
e
s
t, all players
want to maximize thei
r o
w
n
benefit
stand
ard
s
and
mi
nimize
a
d
verse
stan
da
rd.
It lead
s to
vested i
n
tere
st in
not
eno
ugh
allocating, an
d falling into the plight of those w
ho
sel
f
-intere
s
t. This will inevitab
ly lead to ever
y
game
r
cann
o
t
rea
c
h a
n
ag
reem
ent in d
e
termini
ng th
e wei
ght valu
es of
ea
ch in
dex, while
DEA
can
solve such probl
em
s. DEA Game is based on a
ll the players are willing to participate in the
game;
all the players are
willing to
consult together, to reach
a
f
a
ir and
equitable dist
ributi
o
n
assumptio
n
, and con
s
ide
r
i
ng the allia
n
c
e and di
stribu
tion betwe
en
players.
2.1.
Alliance of DE
A
Gam
e
and Characteristic Function
N
represents t
he wh
ole pla
y
ers,
n
N
，
3
,
2
,
1
, any subset S of
N
is call
ed a
coalition,
N
S
. When gam
ers
con
d
u
c
t bene
fits (co
s
ts) all
o
catio
n
, the listed ag
ree
d
that an
importa
nt indi
cator d
enote
d
as
m
i
i
3
,
2
,
1
，
.
Define the
th
i
indicato
r value
of coalition S as
)
(
S
x
i
,
S
j
ij
i
x
S
x
)
(
(
m
i
,
3
,
2
,
1
).
(1)
DEA
max
game
Define th
e chara
c
te
risti
c
function
of coalition S a
s
)
0
)
(
(
),
(
C
S
C
, C(S) i
s
t
he
maximum be
nefit values
of coalition S
obtained,
a
nd C(S) exp
r
essed in th
e
following li
n
ear
prog
ram
m
ing
:
m
i
i
i
S
x
w
S
C
1
)
(
max
)
(
)
,
3
,
2
,
1
(
0
1
.
.
1
m
i
w
w
t
s
i
m
i
i
(1)
Among them,
i
w
is weig
ht value of index
i
under o
ne of the co
alition.
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ISSN: 23
02-4
046
TELKOM
NI
KA
Vol. 12, No. 9, September 20
14: 65
34 – 654
3
6536
We u
s
e
c
N
，
expressing
DEA max game
whose pa
rt
icipants is
N and characteri
stic
function i
s
c,
and it ha
s tra
n
sfer
able
utility. The cha
r
a
c
teri
stic fun
c
ti
on of DEA m
a
x gameh
as t
he
followin
g
natu
r
e:
a) If
N
S
,
N
T
and
T
S
, then
)
(
)
(
)
(
T
C
S
C
T
S
C
;
b)
1
)
(
N
C
.
(2) Sa
me to
ken for
DEA min gam
e, define the cha
r
acte
ri
stic fun
c
tion of
coalit
ion S as
）
，
0
)
(
(
)
(
d
S
d
,
)
(
S
d
is the mini
mum co
st of coalitio
n S paid, and
)
(
S
d
expressed in the
followin
g
line
a
r programmi
ng:
m
i
i
i
S
x
w
S
d
1
)
(
min
)
(
)
,
3
,
2
,
1
(
0
1
.
.
1
m
i
w
w
t
s
i
m
i
i
(2)
Among th
em,
i
w
is
wei
ght val
ue of i
ndex
i
unde
r
o
n
e
of the
coalition. We use
)
,
(
d
N
expre
ssi
ng
DEA max gam
e who
s
e
parti
cipa
nts i
s
N
and
ch
ara
c
te
ristic fun
c
tion
is
d
, and
it ha
s
transferable utility. The charac
teri
stic function of DEA min gamehas the following
nature:
a) If
N
S
,
N
T
and
T
S
, then
)
(
)
(
)
(
T
d
S
d
T
S
d
;
b)
1
)
(
N
d
.
2.2. DEA
Ga
me Bene
fit
Apporti
onme
n
t and
Appor
tionment V
e
c
t
or
Benefit (cost) appo
rtionm
e
n
t is a
core
elem
ent of
DEA game, an
d it plays a
deci
s
ive
role to the st
ability of cooperat
ion alliance. Once the
players found some bei
ng unfairly treated,
the formed
coalition woul
d exist
the risk of rupture.
Therefore,
to maintain the stability of
coo
peration, benefit (cost
)
appo
rtionm
en
t should
satisf
y certain ratio
nality.
Assu
me that coo
perative cost
-sha
rin
g
can be sim
p
lified as tra
n
sfe
rre
d app
ortio
n
ment or
utility, which has a
side payment (or tran
sfer payment). Side payment satisfied:
(1)
All the pla
y
ers a
r
e u
s
in
g the same ut
ility-scal
e
to measure their apportio
n
;
(2) Ea
ch app
ortion of co
alition can be
distri
b
u
ted to
various
colla
borato
r
s in any way,
that is to say, the apportio
n
of players is
transfe
ra
ble.
n
-dime
n
si
onal vector
n
z
z
z
z
,
,
2
1
is the sha
r
e of the p
l
ayers
re
spe
c
tive share of
the coalitio
n's apportio
n
in DEA game, a
nd it satisfie
s the followin
g
con
d
ition
s
:
a) Individual
rati
onality:
)
(
j
C
z
j
or
)
(
j
d
z
j
, (
n
j
,
3
,
2
,
1
).
b) Collective
rati
onality:
1
)
(
1
n
j
j
N
C
z
or
1
)
(
1
n
j
j
N
d
z
.
3
.
M
o
d
e
l
C
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
P
r
o
f
i
t
A
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
Wind
Po
w
e
r’s
Bundled
Transmiss
i
on
Bas
e
d on DEA Game
3.1.
O
v
er
v
i
e
w
o
f
Model
P
a
rameters
Profit apporti
onment is the
difficulty of c
u
rrent
re
sea
r
ch, whi
c
h is
dire
ctly relate
d to vital
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
s
o
f
e
a
c
h
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
i
n
bundle
d
transmi
ssio
n
model
of
wind
po
wer.
(1) T
he ex
ce
ss int
e
re
st
s
The
profit of
allo
cation
in
this
mod
e
l refe
rs
to
th
e exce
ss
inte
re
sts of wind
power’
s
bundl
ed
tra
n
s
missio
n
.
C
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
a
c
t
u
a
l
p
l
anni
ng and
ope
ra
tion of power system, un
d
e
r
t
h
e
n
o
r
m
a
l
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
b
undle
d
tran
smissi
on
m
o
d
e
of
wi
nd
p
o
w
er,
p
o
w
e
r
c
o
m
pani
es will
be
in a
c
cord
an
ce with
existi
ng in
stitution
a
l for
settle
m
ent with
p
a
rticip
ants. E
v
ery six m
o
nths,
according to
previou
s
p
a
ra
meters, po
we
r co
mpa
n
ies
estimate the
exce
ss
retu
rn
s combin
ed
with
actual
co
st calculation
t
able su
bmitted by each p
a
rticipant. Th
at is to say,
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TELKOM
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ISSN:
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046
A Rese
arch o
n
Profit Allocation of the Wind a
nd Oth
e
r Powers
’
Bundle
d
… (He
r
ui Cui
)
6537
PE
PD
PU
M
. Among it, M is the
exce
ss
ret
u
rn
s of
win
d
po
wer’
s
bundl
ed
transmissio
n, PU is the interest
s o
f
wi
nd power gen
eratio
n of consu
m
ptive bund
led
transmissio
n, PD is the co
nsum
ptive wi
nd po
we
r’
s in
terest
s with
o
u
t being bu
nd
led tran
smi
s
sion
in the cu
rren
t grid develo
p
ment situ
ation, and
PE i
s
the contri
b
u
tion amo
unt
of con
s
um
ptive
wind
po
we
r
gene
ration
to
so
cial
be
nefi
t
s. PE mainly
incl
ude
s: e
n
v
ironme
n
tal
benefits,
savi
ng
non-re
ne
wabl
e energy re
so
urces a
nd so on.
(2) T
he pa
rticipants of profit allocation
Wind p
o
wer p
l
ants - to provide win
d
pow
er, and be
ar t
he co
st of win
d
power.
Powe
r g
r
id
e
n
terp
rises - to buil
d
cross-regio
nal
po
wer
grid,
an
d
underta
ke
the
risks
a
nd
costs of wind power grid st
abilit
y after wind power
consumption.
Grid po
we
r p
l
ant can b
e
use
d
for po
wer station
s
of
bundle
d
tra
n
smi
ssi
on (i
n
c
ludi
ng:
thermal p
o
we
r plants, hyd
r
oele
c
tric p
o
wer stat
ion
s
, p
u
mped
stora
ge po
wer pl
a
n
ts, gas turbi
n
e
power plant
s,
nu
clea
r
po
wer
plant
s, etc.) - in
addi
tio
n
to th
e b
a
si
c
se
rvice
s
provided i
n
cl
ud
ing
automatic
ge
neratio
n co
ntrol (AG
C
), p
a
id pea
ki
n
g
, stand
by, paid rea
c
tive p
o
we
r re
gulati
on,
black start, etc., which should be co
mpensated for ancillary servi
c
es.
The an
cilla
ry servi
c
e
s
provided by grid
station
ca
n be divided
into basi
c
ancill
ary
servi
c
es and ancill
ary se
rvices whi
c
h should
be
compensat
ed. Basic ancillary
service
is to
prote
c
t the
safe a
nd
st
able o
peration of po
we
r system, a
n
d
en
su
re p
o
w
er qu
ality. The
gene
rato
rs m
u
st provide this an
cilla
ry servi
c
e,
an
d it include
s p
r
imary freq
ue
ncy, the ba
si
c
peaking, and basically reactive po
wer
regulation. This ancillary
service is not involved i
n
the
exce
ss
return distri
bution
of wind po
wer bu
ndle
d
o
u
tgoing. Only
the ancill
ary
servi
c
e
s
whi
c
h
sho
u
ld be
co
mpen
sated p
r
ovided by oth
e
r gri
d
st
ation
in wind po
we
r’s bu
ndle
d
transmi
ssion
can
partici
pate in
the distrib
u
tio
n
.
3.2. The Basi
c Model of P
r
ofit Alloc
a
ti
on
In this pape
r, we mainly discu
ss the
appli
c
ation of
DEA game
in profit allo
cation of
bundl
ed
tra
n
s
missio
n
mo
de
of
win
d
power,
a
n
d
p
u
t
f
o
r
w
a
r
d
a
n
e
w
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
b
y
u
s
i
n
g
D
E
A
game mo
del to con
d
u
c
t pro
f
it distribution
.
First of all, noting the gam
ers i
s
N, in other
word
s, n
o
ting all of the intere
sts di
stributio
n
of the b
undle
d
tran
smi
s
sio
n
mod
e
of
wi
nd p
o
we
r i
s
N,
n
N
3
,
2
,
1
. Any sub
s
et of
N, S i
s
calle
d a coalit
ion, and
N
S
. Wh
en the game
r
s allocate the
i
r in
tere
sts, they list the important
indicator whi
c
h th
ey a
r
e
all con
s
ide
r
e
d
very i
m
po
rtant, and
ma
rk it
as
m
i
i
3
,
2
,
1
，
, and
they colle
ctively asse
ss th
e index
score
for ea
ch in
di
cator
of ea
ch
game
r
,
ij
x
is index score for
the
th
j
gamer
u
nder the
th
i
indi
cator,
n
j
3
,
2
,
1
. The
g
r
eate
r
the
ij
x
un
der
an in
dicator i
s
,
the better the
evaluation of
the
th
j
gamer i
s
. The matrix
compo
s
e
d
b
y
all of the in
dex score i
s
assume
d to be
X
,
n
m
ij
x
X
, and stan
dardi
ze
d the matrix
X
:
1
1
n
j
ij
x
(
m
i
,
3
,
2
,
1
).
We defin
e the
th
i
index value of alliance S as
)
(
S
x
i
:
S
j
ij
i
x
S
x
)
(
(
m
i
,
3
,
2
,
1
)
(3)
Define the
characteri
stic
function of alliance S as
)
(
S
C
,
)
0
)
(
(
C
,
)
(
S
C
is the be
st
intere
sts valu
e obtaine
d by alliance S, and
)
(
S
C
is expre
s
sed by the fol
l
owin
g linea
r prog
ram:
m
i
i
i
S
x
w
S
C
1
)
(
max
)
(
)
,
3
,
2
,
1
(
0
1
.
.
1
m
i
w
w
t
s
i
m
i
i
(4)
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ISSN: 23
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046
TELKOM
NI
KA
Vol. 12, No. 9, September 20
14: 65
34 – 654
3
6538
In the formul
a,
i
w
is the wei
ght of index
i
unde
r an alli
ance. Obviou
sly,
1
)
(
N
C
.
Z
represents th
e unit sha
r
e o
f
benefits:
m
z
z
z
z
z
,
,
,
3
2
1
.
3.3. Model Solution
In co
ope
rative gam
e, we
can u
s
e
a va
ri
ety of metho
d
s to
analy
z
e
and
solve
th
e gam
e.
The mo
st si
g
n
ificant meth
ods
are: b
a
rg
aining
set
s
, st
able
sets,
core, nucl
eolu
s
, and the Sh
ap
ley
value. As the
solutio
n
of nu
cleol
us m
u
st
be uniq
ue
an
d feasibl
e
, in this arti
cle, we use
nu
cleol
us
to make eve
r
y gamer obtai
ned a fair an
d
reasona
ble a
llocatio
n
of intere
st.
Let
S
i
i
z
S
C
z
S
e
)
(
)
,
(
,
)
,
(
z
S
e
is
difference b
e
twe
e
n
the total
ex
ce
ss be
nefit
and
actual
exce
ss benefit o
b
tai
ned by
ea
ch
appo
rti
onm
en
t, when th
ose
who
be
nefit
sha
r
ing
form
ed
coalitio
n S. t
he g
r
e
a
ter th
e differen
c
e i
s
, the
wo
rse
the effect
of t
h
is
strategy i
s
. Th
ere
a
r
e
n
2
sub
s
et
s of
N
, so the nu
mb
er of
)
,
(
z
S
e
is
n
2
. We can a
r
ray them to a vector in asce
nd
ing
orde
r:
)
(
)
(
),
(
)
(
2
2
1
z
z
z
z
n
.
Nu
cleol
us i
s
defined:
)
(
),
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
C
E
y
y
z
C
E
z
V
N
(5)
Whe
r
ein,
)
(
C
E
is the coll
ectio
n
of all allocatio
n
vectors.
From the a
b
o
v
e, the nucle
olus i
s
an all
o
cati
o
n
to make the
exce
eding ve
ctor
minimal,
possibl
e co
ali
t
ions have a
n
exceedi
ng value definitio
n in the nu
cle
o
lus of all
co
operation, so
we
can
solve the
nucle
olar
sol
u
tion pro
b
lem
by the following linea
r prog
rammin
g
:
S
i
i
z
S
C
z
S
e
)
(
)
,
(
min
)
(
)
(
.
.
N
C
z
S
C
z
t
s
N
i
i
S
i
i
(6)
In the formul
a,
is an arbit
r
arily small re
al numbe
r,
N is all of the intere
sts di
stri
bution
of the bundle
d
transmi
ssio
n mode of wi
nd power, S is
all the non
-empty set
s
of N. This is a
stand
ard lin
e
a
r programmi
ng pro
b
lem,
we can solve it by Matlab.
4. Empiric
a
l Rese
arc
h
on Profit Allocatio
n of the
Wind Po
w
e
r’s Bundl
ed
Transmissi
on
In order to im
prove the ab
sorptive ca
pa
city of wind po
wer, N pe
rso
n
s involve in bundl
ed
transmissio
n
model
of win
d
po
we
r, and
distrib
u
te its
exce
ss ea
rni
ngs. T
a
ke
4
N
, res
p
ec
tivel
y
rep
r
e
s
entin
g
the four pa
rticipa
n
ts of
the gam
e. A
s
sumption
s:
the power g
r
id ente
r
p
r
ises
estimate the
excess e
a
rning
s
in the
first half of 2012 a
s
80
million Yua
n
by the formula:
PE
PD
PU
M
.
4.1. Example Analy
s
is an
d Modeling
Firstly, determine the fou
r
gamers, the
four
gam
ers were: A-win
d
power pl
an
ts whi
c
h
partici
pate in
bundl
ed tra
n
s
missio
n mo
de of wi
nd p
o
we
r; B-po
wer g
r
id e
n
terprises
whi
c
h
wa
s
establi
s
h
ed to maintain th
e grid sta
b
ility and in
ter-region
al powe
r
grid
con
s
truction afte
r the
bundl
ed tra
n
s
missio
n mo
del of win
d
p
o
we
r e
s
tabl
i
s
hed; C-the g
r
id conn
ecte
d thermal
po
wer
plant
whi
c
h
partici
pate
in
bun
dled
tra
n
smi
ssi
on
m
odel
of wi
nd
power;
D- th
e g
r
id
co
nne
cted
hydroel
ect
r
ic
power statio
n
which parti
ci
pate
in bun
dl
ed tran
smi
ssi
on model of
wind p
o
wer.
S
e
c
o
n
d
l
y
,
f
o
u
r
g
a
m
e
r
s
A
,
B
,
C
,
D
,
l
i
s
t
t
he imp
o
rta
n
t
indicator
wh
ich is all
considered
very impo
rta
n
t: power ge
neratio
n, g
r
id
stabilit
y
m
a
i
n
tenan
ce, an
d
excellent p
eaki
ng stan
d
b
y
power, autom
atic gen
eratio
n control (AG
C
), re
ac
tive p
o
we
r re
gulati
on wo
rkl
oad,
and additio
n
a
l
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
TELKOM
NIKA
ISSN:
2302-4
046
A Rese
arch o
n
Profit Allocation of the Wind a
nd Oth
e
r Powers
’
Bundle
d
… (He
r
ui Cui
)
6539
capital
con
s
truction inve
st
ment. We e
m
ploy expert
s
sco
r
e for t
he above
six
indicato
rs o
n
the
basi
s
of the
compl
e
tion ta
ble of
semi
-a
nnual
gen
er
a
t
ing capa
city, table
s
of th
e
pea
kin
g
po
wer
reserve a
nd
use, a
nalysi
s
table of the
rea
c
ti
ve po
wer regulatio
n
worklo
ad, an
d the additio
nal
informatio
n o
n
ca
pital con
s
tru
c
tion inve
stment an
d o
t
her mate
rial
s. It shoul
d b
e
noted th
at, in
the di
stribution of contin
uous excess
int
e
rests, si
x indicators’
scores
will
change along
with t
h
e
different co
ntribution
s
of ea
ch pa
rticipa
n
t.
In
order
to
e
n
su
re
the
accura
cy of
ben
e
f
it distrib
u
tion,
it is necessa
ry to sco
re ev
ery six month
s
dep
endi
ng
on the chan
g
ed materi
als.
Provided by t
h
e
4 partici
pant
s in the first ha
lf of 2012, we
sco
re fo
r the
above six indi
cators, a
s
sh
own in Ta
ble
1.
Table 1.
Each Index Score of every Player
A
B
C
D
Gene
rating capa
city
0.5
0
0.3
0.2
M
a
intenance of gr
id stability
0.1
0.6
0.2
0.1
excellent peakin
g standby power
0.1
0
0.5
0.4
auto
m
atic gener
ation control (AGC)
0.2
0
0.4
0.4
reactive power r
e
gulation workloa
d
0.1
0
0.5
0.4
additional capital cons
truction
investm
ent
0.1 0.7 0.1
0.1
Finally, calculating the intere
sts allo
cation un
de
r all kinds o
f
alliance
s
, and the
cha
r
a
c
teri
stic function valu
e
)
(
S
C
under
different allian
c
e
s
accordi
ng to
formula (3) a
nd (4
), as
sho
w
n in Ta
b
l
e 2:
Table 2.
)
(
S
C
in All Kinds of Alliances
Alliances mode
Notional amount
s of excess interests
Independent
A0
.
5
B0
.
7
C0
.
5
D 0.4
T
w
o collective alliances
AB
0.8
AC
0.8
AD
0.7
BC 0.8
BD
0.8
CD
0.9
Three collective alliances
ABC
0.9
ABD 0.9
ACD
1
.0
BCD
0
.9
Four collective alliances
ABCD
1
.0
4.2. Solution for Example
Model
Bringin
g
the above characteristic fu
ncti
o
n
value into formul
a (6
), we have:
S
i
i
z
S
C
z
S
e
)
(
)
,
(
min
(7)
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
ISSN: 23
02-4
046
TELKOM
NI
KA
Vol. 12, No. 9, September 20
14: 65
34 – 654
3
6540
1
9
.
0
1
9
.
0
9
.
0
9
.
0
8
.
0
8
.
0
7
.
0
8
.
0
8
.
0
4
.
0
5
.
0
7
.
0
5
.
0
.
.
D
C
B
A
D
C
B
D
C
A
D
B
A
C
B
A
C
D
D
B
C
B
D
A
C
A
B
A
D
C
B
A
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
t
s
(
8
)
This i
s
a mu
lti-obje
c
tive p
r
og
rammi
ng
pr
obl
em, be
cause the
participant
s of b
undle
d
transmissio
n
model
of wi
n
d
po
we
r m
u
st
have
win
d
p
o
we
r pl
ants,
then th
e a
bov
e allia
nces e
x
ist
invalid allian
c
es (invali
d
all
i
ances
weight
ing for 0). To
deal with thi
s
part of the i
n
valid allian
c
e
,
we u
s
e line
a
r
weig
hted sum method o
f
Matlab multi-obje
c
tive progra
mming p
r
oble
m
to sol
v
e
nucl
eolu
s
. Each obj
ective functio
n
and it
s given weigh
t
s are
sho
w
n
in Table 3:
Table 3.
The
Obje
ctive Function a
nd its given Weig
hts
Number
Objective
function
The
w
e
ights
1
A
z
5
.
0
min
0.05
2
B
z
7
.
0
min
0
3
C
z
5
.
0
min
0
4
D
z
4
.
0
min
0
5
)
(
8
.
0
min
B
A
z
z
0.1
6
)
(
8
.
0
min
C
A
z
z
0.1
7
)
(
7
.
0
min
D
A
z
z
0.1
8
）
C
B
z
z
(
8
.
0
min
0
9
)
(
8
.
0
min
D
B
z
z
0
10
)
(
9
.
0
min
C
D
z
z
0
11
)
(
9
.
0
min
C
B
A
z
z
z
0.15
12
)
(
9
.
0
min
D
B
A
z
z
z
0.15
13
)
(
1
min
D
C
A
z
z
z
0.15
14
)
(
9
.
0
min
D
C
B
z
z
z
0
15
)
(
1
min
D
C
B
A
z
z
z
z
0.2
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
TELKOM
NIKA
ISSN:
2302-4
046
A Rese
arch o
n
Profit Allocation of the Wind a
nd Oth
e
r Powers
’
Bundle
d
… (He
r
ui Cui
)
6541
Thus, we sol
v
e this proble
m
by using linear
weig
hte
d
sum metho
d
of Matlab and multi-
obje
c
tive linear programmi
ng.
(1) T
o
esta
blish an eval
uat
ion functio
n
o
f
linear wei
g
h
t
ed sum meth
od:
)]
(
8
.
0
[
)]
(
8
.
0
[
)
5
.
0
(
))
(
(
min
3
2
1
C
A
B
A
A
z
z
z
z
z
x
F
h
+
)]
(
9
.
0
[
)]
(
9
.
0
[
)]
(
7
.
0
[
6
5
4
D
B
A
C
B
A
D
A
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
+
)]
(
1
[
)]
(
1
[
8
7
D
C
B
A
D
C
A
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
(9)
We
can
get the obj
ective f
unctio
n
))
(
(
min
x
F
h
by putting the correspon
ding
weights
into the abov
e equatio
n:
)
6
.
0
6
.
0
6
.
0
(
875
.
0
))
(
(
min
D
C
B
A
z
z
z
z
x
F
h
(10)
(2) By Matlab, we c
an get:
.
1368
.
0
1852
.
0
2618
.
0
4162
.
0
D
C
B
A
z
z
z
z
，
，
，
(3) T
he dist
ri
bution of excess ben
efits:
A: 33.296 million yuan; B: 20.944 million
yuan;
C: 14.8
16 million yua
n
; D: 10.944
million
yuan.
5. Model Anal
y
s
is
As can
be
se
en fro
m
the
a
bove mo
del,
accord
ing
to t
he limited
nat
ure
of no
n-re
newable
energy
sou
r
ce
s a
nd th
ei
r imp
a
ct
on
the
enviro
n
m
ent p
o
llutio
n
, win
d
p
o
wer
will
be
co
me
mainst
ream
o
f
power devel
opment
in th
e
future,
and
the
con
s
um
ptive num
ber by
gri
d
i
s
the
ke
y.
Therefore, in
orde
r to the p
o
we
r con
s
titutions to
wa
rds su
staina
ble
dire
ction, a v
a
riety of an
cill
ary
servi
c
e
s
offered by all pa
rti
c
ipa
n
ts n
eed
to get
co
rresp
ondin
g
ly ince
ntive
comp
en
sation, so
a
s
to
provide
prote
c
tion fo
r the
i
m
pleme
n
tatio
n
of p
o
licie
s
to en
cou
r
ag
e
win
d
po
we
r
d
i
g
e
s
t
i
o
n
.
Th
e
earni
ng
s di
st
ribution
sch
e
m
e provided
above i
s
o
n
l
y
an allo
cati
on p
r
in
ciple,
and it
sho
w
s u
s
three
key i
s
sues: Fi
rstly, in determinin
g
the exce
ss
i
n
tere
sts,
we t
entatively esti
mate on
ce ev
ery
six month
s
i
n
volved in
the mate
rial
s provid
ed
by po
wer g
r
id
enterp
r
i
s
e
s
,
and th
e
spe
c
ific
estimation
m
e
thod
s for further
study. Seco
ndly, in
scori
ng fo
r the
six imp
o
rtan
t indicato
rs, you
must determi
ne
it acco
rdin
g
to
th
e cont
ribution ex
te
n
t
o
f
ea
ch
pa
r
t
ic
ip
an
t, w
h
ic
h
is
ba
se
d o
n
six
indicators wit
h
relevant inf
o
rmatio
n, and thus
we n
eed to red
e
fine the score
once eve
r
y six
months. Thi
r
d
l
y, the model exists the wei
ghts
dete
r
min
a
tion, and all partie
s
involved in the gam
e
think it i
s
im
portant to
de
termine
the i
ndex of
subj
ective ju
dgm
ent. So we
need
to
coll
ect
comp
re
hen
si
ve inform
atio
n, and
try to
be
comp
re
he
nsive
and
rati
onal. In
sh
ort
,
the di
stributi
o
n
o
f
e
x
c
e
s
s
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
i
n
the
b
undle
d
tran
smissi
on
m
o
d
e
l
of
wind
po
wer i
s
d
i
f
f
i
c
u
l
t
t
o
s
t
u
d
y
.
I
n
t
h
e
ac
tual
work
,
we try to ac
curately es
timate t
he ex
ce
ss i
n
t
e
re
st
s st
rict
a
c
co
rdan
ce
wit
h
t
h
e
material
s sub
m
itted by each pa
rtici
pant
, and we
st
ri
ctly determin
e
the index
score
s
to ma
ke
s
u
re the relative ac
curac
y
of alloc
a
tion res
u
lt
s
.
5.1. To Deter
m
ine the Ge
neratin
g
Cap
acit
y
Scores of Bundle
d
Deliv
er
y
By the end of 2009, Chin
a laun
che
d
a relat
ed re
se
arch on wi
nd p
o
we
r grid a
n
d
market
con
s
um
ption.
Relate
d research
sh
ows that us
i
ng
a ratio
nal
se
nd meth
od
of wind
po
wer,
hydrop
ower
and th
erm
a
l
power will
he
lp imp
r
ov
e t
r
ansport
effici
ency
and
op
eration
a
l
stab
ility,
and condu
civ
e
to the eco
nomy of both generati
on
and tran
smi
s
sion, an
d improve the sta
b
le
se
curity of the system e
q
u
i
pment [10].
The b
undl
ed
prop
ortio
n
of
win
d
a
nd fire is related t
o
the
minimu
m output
cap
a
city of
sen
d
ing
en
d
thermal
po
wer, o
u
tput fe
ature
s
of
sen
d
ing
end
wi
n
d
po
we
r, p
o
w
er tra
n
smission
curve
a
nd
other facto
r
s,
so we m
a
ke t
he n
o
rth
w
e
s
t
territo
rie
s
wi
th ri
ch
ene
rg
y re
sou
r
ces
and
diverse p
o
we
r con
s
titution
as the
ref
e
re
nce
gri
d
. We
cal
c
ulate
the
merito
riou
s
requireme
nts
of
bundl
ed outg
o
ing cro
s
s-section of win
d
and fire
in
various mo
d
e
s of operation and ru
nni
ng
se
ssi
on, and
arrang
e the o
u
tput
cu
rve o
f
unit plan. We determi
ne the output of
wind p
o
wer a
n
d
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
ISSN: 23
02-4
046
TELKOM
NI
KA
Vol. 12, No. 9, September 20
14: 65
34 – 654
3
6542
thermal
po
wer
units a
c
cordin
g to
th
e ultra-sh
o
r
t-term wind
p
o
we
r pre
d
icti
on re
sults,
t
he
meritori
ou
s re
quire
ment
s of bundle
d
outg
o
ing cro
s
s-
se
ction an
d the
regul
ati
on ch
ara
c
teri
stics of
wind a
nd the
r
mal po
we
r u
n
its. We al
so
con
s
ide
r
the
following fa
ctors in
gene
rating ca
pa
city
asse
ssm
ent index score for four ga
mers:
(1) The
the
r
mal po
we
r
ralated to
bu
ndled
tran
sm
issi
on
of win
d
po
we
r, its ann
ual
gene
rating
capa
city which sho
u
ld g
u
a
rante
e
t
he
achi
evement
of base
d
e
l
ectri
c
ity, wh
en
approved its
ben
chma
rk price.
(2) T
he an
cil
l
ary se
rvice
s
(su
c
h a
s
pe
akin
g ca
pa
city) provide
d
by thermal p
o
we
r to
stabili
ze
the wind power
fluctuatio
ns, it
will bring the
cost of
therm
a
l power in
creased to
some
extent, and i
t
will be fu
rther im
prove
d
throu
gh a
d
d
itional rene
wabl
e en
erg
y
tariff policy
to
comp
en
sat
e
.
5.2. The For
m of Excess
Bene
fit
Distr
i
bution
The form of
exce
ss b
enef
it distribution
is
varied, in
cludi
ng poli
cy guidan
ce a
nd bia
s
,
eco
nomi
c
lev
e
rag
e
, tax in
centive
s
a
n
d
othe
r
sy
s
t
ems
.
Th
is p
ape
r
p
r
es
en
ts th
e
fo
llow
i
ng
fo
r
refer
e
n
c
e:
(1) App
r
op
ri
ation for ca
pital const
r
u
c
tion i
n
vest
ment. Appro
p
riate fo
r th
e capital
con
s
tru
c
tion
i
n
vestment
of
the
parti
cipa
nts
in the bundled tra
n
sm
issi
on mod
e
l of wind po
we
r,
and supp
ortin
g
with more a
d
vanced eq
ui
pment and b
e
tter workin
g condition
s.
(2) Tax i
n
cent
ives. Th
e
ce
rtain tax
retu
rn
mu
st be give
n
po
we
r stati
ons which p
a
rticipate
in
bu
ndled
tra
n
smi
ssi
on of power.
T
he specifi
c
return
ed
am
ount sh
ould be cal
c
u
l
ated
a
c
cordi
n
g
to the
amou
n
t
of an
cilla
ry
servi
c
e
s
whi
c
h shoul
d b
e
comp
en
sated
and
the
ge
n
e
rating
capa
city
whi
c
h pa
rticip
ate in bundl
e
d
transmissio
n.
(3) P
r
ime le
nding
rate. Build po
wer plants fo
r gene
rating
e
l
ectri
c
ity of bundl
ed
transmissio
n
of wind p
o
we
r, and
establi
s
h g
r
i
d
for tran
sp
orting ele
c
tri
c
ity of bundled
transmissio
n. In this way, We
can
obtai
n the pr
i
m
e l
endin
g
rate f
o
r inve
stment
and
con
s
tru
c
tion
loan
s.
5.3. Select Participan
ts o
f
Wind Po
w
e
r Bundled to
Local Condi
tions
We n
eed l
o
cal co
ndition
s whe
n
we se
lect the type
of bundl
ed t
r
an
smi
ssi
on,
and
we
sho
u
ld
combi
ne the
sup
e
ri
ority of local topog
ra
p
h
y a
nd resource
s to co
-o
rdinat
e arran
geme
n
ts.
For exa
m
ple,
in north
we
st territori
es,
the ene
rgy reso
urce
s a
r
e
very rich, a
nd the p
o
we
r
con
s
titution d
i
versified.
Different p
r
ovin
ces have
th
eir own a
d
vanta
ges of resou
r
ce di
strib
u
tio
n
,
hydrop
ower
resou
r
ces a
r
e mainly distributed
in
Qingh
ai, Ga
nsu, e
s
pe
cia
lly the cascade
hydrop
ower
stations in th
e
uppe
r rea
c
h
e
s of the
Ye
ll
ow
River,
with a st
ron
g
ab
ility to regulat
e.
Wind
po
we
r i
s
m
a
inly di
stributed i
n
G
a
n
s
u
and
Xi
njia
ng, the
r
mal
p
o
we
r i
s
m
a
inl
y
distri
buted
i
n
Xinjiang, Sh
anxi, Ningxi
a
. The ene
rgy res
ource
s between
provin
ce
s ex
ist an app
a
r
ent
compl
e
me
nta
r
y advantag
es of sea
s
onality,
and its potential is huge.
Therefo
r
e,
the
compl
e
me
nta
r
ity and natu
r
al dema
nd of
joint ope
rati
on of the gri
d
ch
ara
c
te
rist
ics i
n
no
rthwest
provin
ce
s, which
have
det
ermin
ed that
the bu
ndled
outgoin
g
of
p
o
we
r re
sou
r
ces with
diffe
rent
provin
ce
s, di
fferent types,
different co
sts of el
e
c
tri
c
ity and different
cha
r
a
c
teristics, is t
h
e
inevitable cho
i
ce of ele
c
trici
t
y sending in
north
we
st pro
v
ince
s.
6. Conclusio
n
In this p
ape
r,
according
to the
current
sta
t
us of
wind
p
o
we
r d
e
velop
m
ent, we
pro
pose to
expand the a
b
so
rptive abil
i
ty of wind power, which
is the key to the large
-
scale developm
ent of
wind
po
wer i
n
the future. At
pre
s
ent,
we
all believe th
a
t
the best
wa
y to expand t
he con
s
umpti
v
e
ability of wi
nd
po
we
r i
s
the
bundl
ed tran
smissi
on
mo
d
e
l of
wind
po
wer.
Fo
r the
curre
n
t statu
s
of
some
polici
e
s re
stri
cting t
he implem
ent
ation of
bund
led tran
smi
s
sion model
of wind p
o
wer, i
n
this p
ape
r,
we ta
ke
adv
antage
of
DEA game
to
solve
the
d
i
stributio
n p
r
oblem
of ex
ce
ss
earni
ng
s. All the players a
r
e willi
ng to pa
rticipate i
n
the game a
nd
consult togeth
e
r, with this t
w
o
assumptio
n
s
to re
ach
a
fai
r
a
nd
equitab
l
e di
stributio
n
sche
me,
we
esta
blished
the di
strib
u
tio
n
model of DE
A game exce
ss b
enefits. T
h
rou
gh the ex
ample an
alysi
s
, we verified
the feasibility of
the model. It provide
s
a theoretical b
a
s
is for
the q
uantity and the pra
c
tical form of exce
ss
benefits di
stri
bution in
bu
n
d
led tran
smission
mod
e
l
of
win
d
po
we
r,
so th
at ea
ch
partici
pant
ca
n
obtain ap
pro
p
riate
comp
e
n
satio
n
, in o
r
de
r to be
tte
r motivate their pa
rticip
ation in bu
ndle
d
transmissio
n model of win
d
power, thereby expandi
n
g
the con
s
um
ptive capa
city of wind po
we
r.
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
TELKOM
NIKA
ISSN:
2302-4
046
A Rese
arch o
n
Profit Allocation of the Wind a
nd Oth
e
r Powers
’
Bundle
d
… (He
r
ui Cui
)
6543
In the model
desi
gn of ex
ce
ss
ben
efits di
strib
u
tion
of bundl
ed transmi
ssion
model of
wind
power,
we n
eed to
combine
a larg
e numb
e
r
of related mate
ri
als a
nd
spen
d ce
rtain a
m
o
unt
of wo
rk, to e
s
timate th
e e
x
cess i
n
terests an
d d
e
termine the
sco
r
es of
six im
portant
indi
ca
tors.
More
con
c
i
s
e
and accu
rate
method re
qui
res fu
rthe
r re
sea
r
ch to explore.
Referen
ces
[1]
T
r
anslated b
y
Chin
a E
l
ectric
Po
w
e
r
Res
ear
ch Inst
itute.
R
ene
w
a
b
l
e
en
er
g
y
a
n
d
Po
w
e
r
Grid. Bei
jin
g:
Chin
a Electric
Po
w
e
r Press. 2
009; 12: 2
2
-14
0
.
[2]
W
ang Nin
gb
o, Ding
Ku
n,
Ma
Yanh
on
g,
etc. Bund
le
d
trans
mission
of
w
i
n
d
p
o
w
e
r
a
n
d
th
ermal
po
w
e
r
is
an effective
w
a
y to solv
e the b
o
ttleneck of the
w
i
nd p
o
w
e
r m
a
rket
. Power T
e
chnology
20
1
0
, 7, 1-4.
[3]
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