TELKOM
NIKA
, Vol.13, No
.1, March 2
0
1
5
, pp. 260~2
6
8
ISSN: 1693-6
930,
accredited
A
by DIKTI, De
cree No: 58/DIK
T
I/Kep/2013
DOI
:
10.12928/TELKOMNIKA.v13i1.1181
260
Re
cei
v
ed Se
ptem
ber 28, 2014; Revi
se
d De
ce
m
ber
12, 2014; Accepted Janu
ary 6, 2015
Countering Node Misbehavior Attacks Using Trust
Based Secure Routing Protocol
Adna
n Ahm
e
d
1
, Kamalru
l
nizam Abu
Bak
a
r
1
, Muhammad Ibrahim Channa
2
, Khalid
Has
eeb
1
1
F
a
cult
y
of Co
mputin
g, Unive
r
siti T
e
knologi
Ma
la
ysi
a
, Skud
ai, 813
10, Joh
o
r Bahru, Mal
a
ysi
a
.
2
Department o
f
Information T
e
chn
o
lo
g
y
, Quaid-
e-A
w
am U
n
iversit
y
of En
gin
eeri
ng, Scie
nce an
d
T
e
chnolog
y, N
a
w
a
bsha
h, 674
50, Pakistan.
e-mail: a
dna
n.ahme
d03
@
y
a
h
oo.com
1
, knizam@utm.my
1
, ibrah
eem_c
ha
n
na@
ya
ho
o.co
m
2
,
khali
dutm.pcrg
@gmai
l
.com
1
A
b
st
r
a
ct
W
i
reless s
ens
or netw
o
rks h
a
v
e ga
in
ed r
e
markab
le
appr
ec
iatio
n
ov
er the
last few
years.
Desp
ite
signific
ant a
d
v
antag
es an
d tremen
dous
ap
plicati
ons, WSN is vul
nera
b
l
e
to variety of
attacks. Due
to
resourc
e
co
nstraint n
a
ture
of
WSN, app
lica
b
ility
of tr
aditi
o
nal s
e
curity s
o
lutio
n
s is
deb
a
t
able. Alt
hou
g
h
cryptogra
phy, authe
nticati
on
and c
onfi
d
e
n
ti
ality
me
asures
hel
p i
n
pr
eve
n
ting s
pec
ific types of
attacks bu
t
they can
not safegu
ard a
gai
nst nod
e misb
ehav
ior atta
ck
s and co
me at signific
ant co
st. T
o
address thi
s
prob
le
m, w
e
p
r
opos
e a
T
r
ust
Base
d S
e
cur
e
R
outin
g Pr
otocol
(T
BSRP)
w
h
ich re
lies
o
n
d
i
stribute
d
tr
ust
mo
de
l for the
detectio
n
a
nd i
s
olati
on of
mis
beh
avin
g n
ode
s. T
he T
BSRP
ai
ms to estab
l
ish short
e
st pa
th
that contai
n al
l
trusted no
des,
ide
n
tify packet
forw
ar
ding
mis
beh
avior c
aus
e
d
by
mal
i
cio
u
s
and fa
ulty no
d
e
s
and r
e
ro
ute th
e traffic to oth
e
r rel
i
ab
le
path
s
. T
he per
for
m
ance
of T
BSR
P is ev
alu
a
ted
in ter
m
s
of pac
ke
t
deliv
ery ratio,
avera
ge e
nd-t
o
-en
d
de
lay a
nd nor
mali
z
e
d
routing l
o
a
d
. Simu
lati
ons r
e
sults show
that
T
BSRP can
achi
eve b
o
th
hig
h
de
liv
ery
ratio a
nd
thr
o
ugh
put i
n
pre
s
ence
of vari
ous n
u
m
b
e
rs of
mis
b
e
havi
ng a
nd faulty n
odes
.
Ke
y
w
ords
: trust,
w
i
reless se
nsor netw
o
rks, security, nod
e mis
b
e
havi
o
r, faulty nod
es
1. Introducti
on
The interest of rese
arch
comm
unity has si
gnifica
ntly increa
se
d
in sensor n
e
tworks
durin
g la
st
few yea
r
s d
ue to l
o
w-cost
solutio
n
s for dive
rsity of appli
c
a
t
ions i
n
cl
udi
ng
environ
menta
l
monitori
ng,
vehicle
tra
c
king
and
det
ection,
healt
h
ca
re, traffic co
ntrol i
n
smart
roads, battle field monitori
ng,
surveillance and battle damage asse
ssment [1]–[
3
]. Most of the
times
WSN o
perate
s
in
un
-attende
d env
ironm
ents
wh
ich exp
o
ses t
he de
ployed
sen
s
o
r
no
de
s to
variety of s
e
curity attac
k
s
[4],[5]. The s
e
c
u
rity
attacks in WSN
may
be c
l
as
s
i
fied into tw
o types
:
Outsid
er (Ext
ernal
)
atta
cks
an
d
Insi
de
r or
nod
e m
i
sbe
h
a
v
ior
attacks
[6]. In
outs
i
der attac
k
,
attacker l
a
cks a
u
thenti
c
ati
on a
nd
key i
n
formatio
n
a
nd
su
ch type
of attack
ca
n ea
sily be
d
ealt
with cl
assi
cal
se
curity me
cha
n
ism
su
ch as
crypto
g
r
aphy, en
cryption an
d au
thenticatio
n. In
insid
e
r attack, an adversa
ry alrea
d
y has all key
and
cryptog
r
ap
hi
c inform
ation
so that it can
easily
cha
n
g
e
the b
ehavio
r of a
nod
e. T
herefo
r
e,
su
ch type of no
d
e
misbeh
avio
r attacks
can
not
be dealt with
traditional secu
rity measure
s
. The m
o
st com
m
on
insid
e
r attacks are
wormh
o
le,
blackh
ole, sel
e
ctive forwarding an
d sin
k
hole attacks
[7]–[9]. Several s
e
c
u
re s
o
lutions
have been
develop [1
0]–
[
12] to prote
c
t WSN ag
ain
s
t variety
of attacks. However, these solution
s expl
oit
traditional
se
curity me
ch
a
n
ism
s
such a
s
cryptog
r
ap
hy and a
u
the
n
tication
whi
c
h are
mo
stly not
suitabl
e to
counter n
ode
s’ misbeh
avior attacks a
s
t
hese te
chni
q
ues a
s
sume
that pa
rticip
ating
node
s
as
co
operative an
d tru
s
two
r
thy. Ho
weve
r, th
i
s
a
s
sumptio
n
is
not reali
s
tic for in
side
r
or
node mi
sbe
h
a
vior attacks
[13]. Similarly, these tr
aditi
onal security measures re
quire
som
e
sort
of central a
d
minist
ration
for se
cu
rity manag
em
e
n
t whi
c
h is
usu
a
lly not available in
self-
orga
nized ad
-ho
c
and
sen
s
or n
e
two
r
ks [14]. The
effica
cy of cryp
tograp
hy based solutio
n
s
is
ineffective in
a ca
se
where
an a
u
thori
z
e
d
co
mpromi
sed sen
s
o
r
no
de du
e to int
e
rnal
attack,
can
have easy a
c
ce
ss to mem
o
ry conte
n
ts
and valid se
cr
et keys [15].
In addition, these tradition
al
se
curity
solut
i
ons req
u
ire high comp
utation,
memo
ry and en
erg
y
con
s
umptio
n whi
c
h
re
strict
their implem
e
n
tation in re
source con
s
tra
i
ned sen
s
or n
ode
s [16].
To overcom
e
limitations of
traditional
se
curity
p
r
imitives, the
con
c
e
p
t of trust h
a
s
be
en
su
ccessfully applie
d
to ad
-ho
c
and
sen
s
or
n
e
two
r
ks
to co
unte
r
n
o
de mi
sbe
havi
o
r
attacks.
Trust
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
TELKOM
NIKA
ISSN:
1693-6
930
Countering Node Misbehavior Attacks Usi
ng
Trust B
a
sed Secure
R
outing .... (Adnan Ahm
ed)
261
manag
eme
n
t is
an
effecti
v
e tool that i
s
suitabl
e
for se
cu
rity architecture of
sen
s
o
r
n
e
twork
[17],[18]. Several tru
s
t aware routing schem
es
h
a
ve
been develo
ped over the
years. In [19] a
geographical
trust aware routing
prot
ocol fo
r com
bating blackhole and grayhole attacks i
n
sen
s
o
r
netwo
rk i
s
pro
p
o
s
e
d
, which ho
wever gen
erate huge a
m
ou
nt of traffic over network by
sen
d
ing
pe
rio
d
ic u
pdate
s
f
o
r
colle
cting f
i
rstha
nd
(di
r
e
c
t) a
nd
se
co
n
dhan
d (i
ndire
ct) info
rmatio
n.
Moreover, if t
he node
mobility is
very hi
gh it may increase t
r
ust build-up mechanism
time.
To
defend
again
s
t wo
rmh
o
le
attack i
n
WS
N, a tru
s
t-
a
w
are
routin
g framework (TARF)
ha
s be
e
n
prop
osed [20
]. Each nod
e
to kee
p
s
re
cord for
trust
and e
nergy co
st va
lue
s
for thei
r known
neigh
bors. T
r
ust evalu
a
tio
n
is
ba
sed
o
n
dete
c
ti
ng
routing lo
op
s, wh
ere
a
s no
des involved
in
routing lo
op
s are pe
nali
z
e
d
. Energy co
ntrol me
ssag
es a
r
e broad
ca
sted that contain
s
ene
rgy
co
st informat
ion to
deliver a p
a
cket.
Howeve
r,
b
r
oa
dca
s
ting
of e
nergy
co
ntrol
pa
ckets m
a
y
increa
se rout
ing load a
n
d
it may also suffers from
selfishne
ss a
ttack whe
r
e
a com
p
romi
sed
node m
a
y se
nd false ene
rgy co
st information.
A trusted n
ode m
a
y be de
cla
r
ed a
s
mali
ci
ous
node
if it d
r
op
s p
a
cket
s
du
e to
sig
n
ifica
n
t level of
co
nge
stion.
In [
21] tru
s
t b
a
se
d routing
protocol
based o
n
A
O
DV (TAO
DV) is
pro
p
o
s
ed for
MANE
T whi
c
h
expl
oits tru
s
t info
rmation i
n
ro
ute
discovery. Th
e pro
p
o
s
ed
schem
e is n
o
t feasible
fo
r reso
urce
con
s
trained
enviro
n
ment such as
WSN a
s
it is comp
utation
a
lly
intensive
and ma
ke
s
use of
crypto
grap
hic m
o
d
u
le for p
r
ovid
ing
se
curity. Furt
herm
o
re, aut
hors did not consi
der t
he ef
fects of attacks o
n
their propo
sed sch
e
m
e.
A trust aware
routing p
r
oto
c
ol (TA
R
P) h
a
s be
en p
r
op
ose
d
for sen
s
or a
c
tuator
n
e
twork [22]. T
he
para
m
eters li
ke e
c
h
o
ratio
and li
nk
qua
lity have
bee
n used fo
r ev
aluating th
e t
r
ust
w
o
r
thine
s
s.
The e
c
h
o
ra
tio rep
r
e
s
e
n
ts b
r
oa
dcast
overhe
ari
ng
messag
es in
pro
m
iscu
ou
s mo
de. TA
RP
make
s u
s
e of
various b
r
o
a
d
ca
st and u
n
i
c
a
s
t messa
g
e
s for mai
n
tai
n
ing an
d upd
ating link q
ual
ity,
comm
uni
cati
on state and
echo ratio. Ho
wever,
the
type of node misbe
havio
r attacks an
d
its
effect on tru
s
t model i
s
neither
menti
oned
nor
co
nsid
ere
d
. Th
e link q
uality para
m
eter f
o
r
evaluating tru
s
t is n
o
t an a
ppro
p
ri
ate ch
oice
as
lin
k q
uality may de
grad
es
due t
o
infere
nce o
r
noise whi
c
h
effects in the
deci
s
ion ma
king
cap
abilit
y of trust model. Furthe
rm
ore, effica
cy of
prop
osed scheme is o
n
ly measu
r
e
d
in term of
energy con
s
umpti
on whi
c
h is
not the relev
ant
para
m
eter fo
r evaluatin
g
the effica
cy of trust
b
a
se
d sche
me. In [23], a tru
s
t ba
sed
ro
u
t
ing
scheme, F
r
ie
ndship ba
se
d
AODV (F
r-A
ODV), i
s
pr
e
s
ente
d
to co
unter bl
ackh
ole attack. Trust
evaluation is
based on cert
ain feature
s
such a
s
nod
e reputation an
d
node i
dentity. Each feature
is a
s
signe
d
attribute n
u
m
ber that is excha
nge
d
duri
ng p
a
cket forwa
r
din
g
. Ho
weve
r, the
prop
osed
sol
u
tion is n
o
t completely ro
b
u
st agai
nst n
ode mi
sbe
h
a
v
ior attacks.
The auth
enticated
comp
romi
se
d
nod
e may
e
x
chan
ge fal
s
e information
su
ch
a
s
fea
t
ure attri
bute
numb
e
r whi
c
h
may lead to inco
rrect de
cision ma
kin
g
by trust model. More
ove
r
, Fr-AO
D
V is vulnerable
to
wormhol
e attack wh
ere a
malicio
us n
o
de impe
rson
ates its ide
n
tity. The incre
a
se
d numb
e
r of
route mai
n
ten
ance call
s an
d excha
nge o
f
hello me
ssa
ges al
so in
creases lo
ad o
n
truste
d nod
es.
In this pap
er,
we p
r
op
ose
a light wei
g
ht and qui
ckl
y
deployable
Tru
s
t Base
d
Secu
re
Routin
g Proto
c
ol
(TBSRP
)
for WS
N to
d
e
tect a
nd i
s
ol
ate misbeh
aving an
d faulty
node
s. TBS
R
P
employ dis
t
ributed trus
t model for dy
namic
i
dentific
ation of malic
i
ous
and faulty nodes
and
thereby i
s
ol
ates th
em at e
a
rlie
st. TBSRP can
re
-r
out
e the p
a
cket
s to alte
rn
ate
route
s
if a
c
ti
ve
paths e
n
coun
ter faulty or misbe
having
node
s.
The n
ode’
s tru
s
t level and hop
count are use
d
for
sele
cting
reli
able an
d sho
r
test route. T
he re
st
of thi
s
pa
per i
s
o
r
gani
zed a
s
f
o
llows. Secti
on 2
provide
s
p
r
o
posed TBSRP sch
eme.
Section 3
pr
ese
n
ts the
rese
arch m
e
thod
s. Sectio
n 4
pre
s
ent
s the simulatio
n
re
sults a
nd sect
ion 4 co
ncl
u
d
e
s the pa
per.
2. TBSRP- P
r
opose
d
Sch
e
me
The routin
g in WSN is mo
deled a
s
dire
cted graph
,
,
where
r
e
p
r
es
en
ts
s
e
t
of sen
s
or n
o
de in netwo
rk,
rep
r
esents
the set of links between th
e node
s and
represents
the metri
cs
u
s
ed fo
r mea
s
uring li
nks. A trusted
path
con
s
ist of
set of trusted
sen
s
o
r
no
de
s
,
,
,
…
,
∈
and
,
∈
. F
o
r
eac
h
,
∈
, it is assu
med that n
o
d
e
is th
e sen
der
node
and nod
e
is
the receive
r
node. It is assume
d that a faulty node
may drop pa
ckets ra
ndom
ly
due to
significant cong
estio
n
an
d its b
e
h
a
vior i
s
m
ode
led a
s
sh
ows
in Eq.(1
)
,
whil
e the
mali
cio
u
s
node al
way
s
drop
s all the receive
d
pa
ckets.
1
0
(1)
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
ISSN: 16
93-6
930
TELKOM
NIKA
Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2
015 : 260 – 2
6
8
262
The p
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
tru
s
t ba
se
routing
schem
e, T
BSRP, ex
tends ro
uting
mech
ani
sm
o
f
AODV
proto
c
ol. The
Trust Eval
ua
tor, Trust dat
aba
se, Route
Resolve
an
d
Route Setup
c
o
ns
titutes
the
four buil
d
ing
blocks
of prop
osed T
BSRP sc
he
me. The Trust Evaluato
r
evaluate
s
the
trust
w
orthi
n
e
s
s of n
ode
s.
The trust
dat
aba
se
stor
es all n
e
cessa
r
y informatio
n
req
u
ired i
n
t
r
ust
establi
s
hm
en
t su
ch a
s
No
de ID, p
a
cke
t
forwa
r
din
g
ratio, dire
ct a
nd indi
re
ct trust value
s
. T
h
e
route
setu
p i
s
re
spo
n
si
ble f
o
r findi
ng
rou
t
es that
conta
i
ns
all tru
s
ted
node
s. If at
some late
r tim
e
some
mali
cio
u
s, faulty or
energy
defici
ent nod
e be
come
s p
a
rt
of
active rout
e, route
re
so
lve
pro
c
e
ss i
s
initiated to inform sou
r
ce nod
e to establi
s
h
new tru
s
ted
path.
2.1. Trust Ev
a
l
uator
The tru
s
t ev
aluator
evalu
a
tes the t
r
u
s
twor
thin
ess o
f
neighb
or n
ode
s by ove
r
hea
rin
g
their tra
n
smi
s
sion in
monit
o
ring
mode [
24] and dy
n
a
m
ically ind
ent
ifies misbeh
a
v
ing node
s. T
h
e
results obtai
ned from m
onitorin
g
pa
cket
forwardi
n
g
behavio
r of nodes are
stored in
Tr
u
s
t
databa
se
. Based on the packet forwa
r
d
i
ng behavio
r of node
, node
evalutes trust for node
r
e
pr
es
e
n
t
ed
b
y
,
as in equ
ation (2
).
,
,
,
(2)
,
denotes the
degree of direct trust nod
e
has for nod
e
, based o
n
the node
’s
observation
of packet forwarding be
h
a
vior for node
.
,
repre
s
ents the average
degree of indire
ct trust n
ode
has gai
ned usi
ng re
comm
end
atio
ns from its n
e
ighb
ors (
) for
node
.
The weight facto
r
s
and
are a
s
sign
ed to
,
an
d
,
re
spe
c
tiv
e
l
y
,
su
ch t
hat
1
,
wh
erea
s
0
1
and
0
1
.
The di
re
ct tru
s
t,
,
in equ
ation (2
), re
pre
s
ent
s fund
am
ental entity in
con
s
tituting
trust
model
and it
is eva
l
uated
by m
onitorin
g
th
e
beh
avior of
neig
hbo
r
no
des. In
o
r
de
r to
estimate the
dire
ct trust, we com
pute p
a
cket fo
rward
i
ng ratio of a
node. Th
e pa
cket forwardi
ng
ratio i
s
the
measure of
numbe
r of
correctly
forwarde
d pa
cket
s to the
nu
mber
of pa
ckets
sup
p
o
s
ed to
be forwarded,
as sh
own in equatio
n (3
).
,
∑
∑
(3)
Every time a
node receives a packet from neigh
bori
ng node
incremented
by 1. Similarl
y, every time
the n
ode
su
ccessf
ully forwards the
re
ceived
pa
cke
t
s to inte
nde
d
destin
a
tion
is incre
m
ente
d
by 1.
An indire
ct trust in evalu
a
t
ed from the
obse
r
vation
s gained th
ro
ugh inte
ra
ctions
with
neigh
bors wh
o notify about their ow
n direct ob
se
rvation for particu
lar node. Th
e indire
ct trust
,
is evaluated
as:
,
∑
,
(4)
,
rep
r
e
s
ent
s the deg
re
e of
indire
ct tru
s
t evaluated b
y
node
(com
mon nei
ghb
o
r
of
node
and node
). The evaluated indirect trust is exch
ange
d as a p
a
rt of recom
m
endatio
n wi
th
node
.
,
is the averag
e of existing tru
s
t evaluated by ne
ighbo
rs of no
de
(nod
e
) for node
.
Tru
s
t e
s
timation involving i
ndire
ct tru
s
t
degree
sp
ee
ds-up th
e co
nverge
nce of
trust eval
uat
ing
pro
c
e
ss. Ba
sed on
pa
cket
forwardi
ng
ratio, trust m
o
del at n
ode
expre
s
se
s the be
havior
of
neigh
bor
as
either:
well-behave
or
m
a
licious-behave
. If the packet forwardi
ng
ratio of n
ode
is
above spe
c
ified thre
sh
old
, the node is
con
s
id
ere
d
a
s
well
-b
ehav
e (tru
sted
) no
de, otherwi
se
it
is co
nsi
dered
as malici
o
u
s
node.
Figure 1
sh
o
w
s the a
naly
s
is and
effica
cy of tru
s
t e
s
t
i
mation me
ch
anism
of tru
s
t
model.
The
weight f
a
ctor plays a
n
impo
rtant role in
trust e
s
timation
so
we a
s
sign
ed
highe
r weight
to
direc
t
trus
t (
0
.
6
) than indi
rect tru
s
t (
0
.
4
) becau
se it
corre
s
p
ond
s to direct
observation
s
gaine
d by a node with its own interact
ions
which are more a
c
curate and timel
y
available. It is ob
serve
d
that trust deg
ree fo
r
well behave n
ode
s increa
se li
nearly with ti
me.
Similarly, tru
s
t degree val
u
es fo
r mi
sbe
h
a
ving no
de
s
decrea
s
e
s
as the si
mulatio
n
proceed
s. It is
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a
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due to fact that trust rating
for well beh
aving node
s i
n
creme
n
ted each time as it cooperate
s
in
packet forwa
r
ding. O
n
co
ntrary, neg
ative assess
m
e
nt for misbe
h
a
ving nod
e
s
is increm
ent as
they drop the
packet
s
.
Figure 1. Averag
e tru
s
t for misb
ehavin
g and tru
s
ted
node
s
The d
e
si
gn
o
f
our t
r
u
s
t m
odel
doe
s n
o
t
make
u
s
e
of crypto
grap
hy, thereby
requiri
ng
least comput
ations. In add
ition, our trust
model
avoid
s
the use of reso
urce inten
s
ive paramet
ers
for tru
s
t esti
mation such as secu
rity attributes, lin
k
quality and rout
ing loo
p
. Therefore, it offers
light wei
ght
se
cure soluti
on which nei
ther im
p
o
ses too many
constraints no
r re
quires a
n
y
spe
c
iali
zed
set of resources. The
s
e fe
ature
s
togeth
e
r with
dyna
mic dete
c
tion
of misbe
hav
ing
node
s m
a
kes ou
r tru
s
t m
o
del a
n
a
pprop
riate
choi
ce
f
o
r re
sou
r
ce constraine
d WSN
a
s
com
p
a
r
ed
to existing scheme
s
.
2.2. Route S
e
tup
The
Ro
ute Setup
is re
spon
sible for establishing
shorte
st an
d trusted ro
ute. The
prop
osed scheme expan
ds
th
e
rout
e
setup
process of A
O
DV i
n
orde
r
to select relia
ble
an
d
efficient path
that contai
ns
all relia
ble an
d truste
d no
d
e
s. The
distin
guishing
cha
r
acteri
stics th
at
lead
s
to
the sele
ction of AODV
p
r
oto
c
ol are: it is o
n
-de
m
an
d p
r
otocol
mea
n
s it enabl
es to
find
route
s
whe
n
it
is
d
e
si
re
d and red
u
ces
co
ntrol
pa
cket overhead,
provides
fre
s
h/late
st rout
es
informatio
n, cap
able
of b
o
th broad
ca
st and u
n
ic
ast
routin
g, low con
n
e
c
tion
setup tim
e
, more
scalabl
e and
redu
ce
d sto
r
age cost. TB
SRP make u
s
e of comp
o
s
ite ro
uting
metric,
whe
r
e an
equal and a
daptive weig
hts
0
.
5
and
0
.
5
are assi
gned to node’
s trust level and h
o
p
cou
n
t re
sp
ectively which
sele
cts tru
s
te
d an
d
sho
r
te
st
path
s
fo
r routing. High delivery ratio
is
achi
eved
wh
en reliable
n
ode
s a
r
e
sel
e
cted fo
r d
e
l
i
very pa
ckets to de
stinati
on. Co
nsi
d
e
r
a
netwo
rk
sh
own in Figu
re 2
(
a) which a
s
sumes
nod
e
as the
send
er
and no
de
as the re
ceiver.
Nod
e
wishe
s
to transmit data packets t
o
node
, it broad
ca
sts RREQ packet to its neighbo
rs
to initiate ro
ute discove
r
y process. T
he nei
g
hbo
ri
ng nod
es fo
rwards
RREQ
packet to their
neigh
bor n
o
d
e
s an
d also
make
reverse
route entry for nod
e
,
same process continues till route
requ
est
packet rea
c
h
e
s to
destin
a
tion.
De
stination
(node
) u
n
ica
s
ts
RREP
pa
cket to nod
e
along the
re
verse
route.
If multiple RREQ pa
ck
ets have been
received by
destin
a
tion from
sou
r
ce via
di
fferent route
s
, it se
nd
s m
u
ltiple
RREP
pa
ckets alo
ng
reverse
routes to
so
u
r
ce
node. Thi
s
a
ssi
sts
nod
e
to make de
ci
sion a
c
cordi
n
g
l
y and app
r
o
p
riate p
a
th a
m
ong avail
a
b
l
e
paths is
sele
cted
co
mpri
si
ng of
only t
r
usted
no
de
s. When
a
RREP packet
is re
ceive
d
by
an
interme
d
iate node
from its down
s
trea
m neighbo
r
, which is not
a destination node, node
refers to the t
r
ust tabl
e to
check the trust
value of nod
e
. If node
is
trusted
one, it
is incl
ude
d in
the ro
ute, se
nd RREP me
ssage to it
s u
p
stre
am n
o
d
e
(no
d
e
)an
d
make
s fo
rw
ar
d ro
ute entry
for
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015 : 260 – 2
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264
node
. RREP packet is drop
ped by node
if it fin
d
node
as unreli
able no
de, and sam
e
pro
c
e
s
s rem
a
ins continu
e
until
route
re
ply pa
cket
re
ach
e
s at
so
u
r
ce
n
ode. S
o
urce
nod
e ta
kes
the ro
uting
p
a
th
a-b-c-d
a
s
it i
s
sho
r
test path (co
n
tai
n
s
all tru
s
ted
nod
es) a
nd f
r
ee
of mali
cio
u
s
node
s. The Fi
gure 3
sho
w
s the flow cha
r
t for t
he route
discovery of prop
osed TB
SRP scheme.
(a)
(b)
Figure 2. Ro
ute Discove
r
y
and Ro
ute maintena
nce proce
s
s
2.3. Route
Resolv
e
The responsi
bility of
Route Resolve
proce
dure is to send
Route
E
rro
r
cont
rol packet to
sou
r
ce no
de
so that n
e
w
route may
be establi
s
h
ed whe
n
the con
d
ition
,
becom
es tru
e
meanin
g
that
an a
c
tive route en
co
unt
ers
so
me
m
a
licio
us o
r
f
aulty node
s
who
s
e
pa
cke
t
forwa
r
di
ng ra
tio is less tha
n
sp
ecified th
reshol
d val
u
e
.
In propo
se
d
scheme, rou
t
e maintena
n
c
e
pro
c
e
s
s
i
s
carri
ed out wheneve
r
a
n
i
n
terme
d
ia
te
node
find
s p
a
cket fo
rwarding
misb
eh
avior
cau
s
e
d
by m
a
licio
us
or fa
ulty node
s. A Rout
e
Error
(RE
R
R) me
ssag
e ha
s
bee
n gen
erated
an
d
forwa
r
d
ed to
so
urce
nod
e to find
alt
e
rnate
route.
Source
no
de, re
po
rting
nod
e a
nd
all
interme
d
iate
node
s ma
rks that route a
s
an invalid
route an
d so
urce nod
e st
arts n
e
w rou
t
e
discovery p
r
o
c
e
ss.
Con
s
id
er the exa
m
pl
e sh
own in figure
2(b), wh
ere n
ode
finds the
co
nditi
on
,
has become
true for node
, it consid
er the node
as misbe
having
node and forwards
RERR me
ssa
ge to sou
r
ce node
(no
de
) for finding a n
e
w reli
able
ro
ute.
3. Resear
ch
Method
In this study, NS-2 simul
a
tor [25] has been u
s
e
d
to analyze the performa
n
ce of
prop
osed TBSRP
sch
e
me
.
We co
nsi
d
er
bl
ackh
ole attack
for
si
mulating misbehavin
g
no
de
s
whe
r
e comp
romise
d nod
e
s
se
nd fake route di
scove
r
y packet
s
to attract most
of traffic. The
behavio
r of faulty node
s is also simul
a
ted as so
me
of the node
s drop p
a
cket
s rand
omly due
to
netwo
rk fa
ults or
sig
n
ifica
n
t cong
estio
n
level.
Our si
mulation mo
d
e
l is ba
se
d o
n
a network o
f
50
sen
s
o
r
n
ode
s deploye
d
ra
ndomly
withi
n
an
are
a
of
1000m
x 800
m. The n
u
mb
ers of mali
cio
u
s
and faulty nodes are varie
d
from 0 to
5. In al
l experiments, the packet forwa
r
di
ng threshold (
is
set to 0.6
whi
l
e the tru
s
t th
reshold
(
is
se
t to 0.8. All node
s a
r
e initi
a
lize
d
with
ne
utral
trust value 0.
5. We used IEEE 802.15.4 as the MA
C layer protocol. Constant Bit Rate (CBR)
traffic ha
s be
en u
s
ed fo
r th
e flows with p
a
cket si
ze e
q
ual to 150
0 b
y
tes while th
e
simulatio
n
time
is 10
00
se
co
nds. T
he p
e
rf
orma
nce TB
SRP and
AO
DV is
analy
z
ed in te
rm
s o
f
packet d
e
livery
ratio, avera
g
e
end-to
-en
d
d
e
lay and no
rmalize
d
ro
uting load.
4. Results a
nd Discu
ssi
on
Figure 4
sh
o
w
s the
perfo
rmance of
TBSRP an
d
AO
DV in te
rm
s
of pa
cket deli
v
ery ratio
(PDR)
agai
n
s
t num
be
r of
malici
o
u
s
a
nd faulty no
d
e
s. It is
evid
ent from
the
results th
at b
o
th
AODV and T
BSRP sho
w
s increa
sed P
DR
whe
n
the
r
e no mali
cio
u
s an
d faulty node
s in net
work.
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ng
Trust B
a
sed Secure
R
outing .... (Adnan Ahm
ed)
265
The differen
c
e be
come
s p
r
ominent
whe
n
at maximu
m numb
e
r of
malicio
us
an
d faulty node
s a
s
s
h
ow
n
in
F
i
gu
r
e
4(
a
)
an
d (
b
)
.
T
h
e
PDR
fo
r
AO
DV decrea
s
e
s
si
gnifica
nt
ly by almost 90%
as
mos
t
of the t
r
affic
is
attrac
ted towards malic
io
u
s
n
o
des,
as sh
own in Fi
gure 4
(
a). By a
pplyi
ng
TBSRP, delivery ratio incre
a
se
s
sig
n
ifica
n
tly as propo
sed
sch
eme
help the nod
e
s
to find trust
ed
route
s
a
nd i
s
olate
mali
ci
ous
nod
es a
t
earlie
s
t. Similarly, Figu
re 4(b)
sh
ows that TBS
R
P
signifi
cantly improve
s
the
PDR when
few faul
ty nodes d
r
op
ran
dom num
ber of packets
du
e
con
g
e
s
tion in
active route
s
.
Figure 3. TBSRP Route
Discovery Flo
w
chart
Figure 5
sho
w
the
compa
r
ative results of ave
r
age
end-to
-e
nd
d
e
lay for AO
DV an
d
TBSRP unde
r malici
o
u
s
a
nd faulty nod
es. When the
r
e a
r
e no mi
sbe
having n
o
des in
netwo
rk,
delay i
s
simil
a
r fo
r AO
DV
and
TBSRP.
As the
num
b
e
r
of faulty an
d mali
ciou
s n
ode
s in
crea
ses i
n
the network, i
t
cre
a
tes mo
re ro
ute di
sco
nne
ctio
n
s
whi
c
h
re
sults i
n
i
n
crea
sed
del
ay perfo
rma
n
c
e
as sho
w
n in
Figure
5(a
)
and (b
). T
BSRP relie
s on truste
d
and sho
r
test
route
s
avoi
ding
misbe
having
and fa
ulty no
des the
r
efore
it sho
w
s bett
e
r
perfo
rma
n
c
e i
n
te
rm
as average
del
ay
as compa
r
ed
to AODV where lea
s
t nu
mber of pa
ckets delivered
to destinatio
n in pre
s
en
ce of
increa
sed n
u
m
ber of mali
cious a
nd fault
y
nodes.
The no
rmali
z
ed routin
g lo
ad is an imp
o
tant
desig
n factor that should be
con
s
ide
r
ed
while
de
signi
ng a
routin
g
proto
c
ol
s fo
r WS
N.
As WSN
i
s
re
source co
nstrained network,
increa
sed
ro
uting lo
ad m
a
y badly
effects th
e n
e
tw
ork lifetime
o
f
WSN. Fi
gu
re 6
(
a
)
a
nd
(b)
demon
strate the hig
her
net
work
overlo
a
d
s fo
r AO
DV than
TBSRP as
it
requi
re
s more numb
e
r
of
retra
n
smi
s
sio
n
s d
ue to
prese
n
ce of m
a
licio
us
and
faulty node
s in a
c
tive ro
utes. Th
e m
o
re
numbe
r of co
trol pa
cket
s
for ro
ute discvoerie
s furt
h
e
r contrib
u
te
s to increa
se
d routing lo
a
d
of
AODV. On
contra
ry, the route remai
n
s more
st
able
in TBSRP
d
ue to
com
p
ri
sing
of tru
s
te
d
node
s, theref
ore requi
re le
ss n
u
mbe
r
of
retra
n
missio
n
s
and route di
scoverie
s.
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TELKOM
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Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2
015 : 260 – 2
6
8
266
(a)
(b)
Figure 4. PDR perfo
rma
n
ce with malici
o
us an
d faulty node
s
To sum
-
up, the pro
p
o
s
ed
TBSRP offers a mult
ifacet routing strateg
y
thereby minimizin
g
the
overall routing and
n
e
twor
k
overh
ead
s for resource
co
nst
r
ained
sen
s
or nod
es.
Tabl
e 1
pre
s
ent
s
th
e comp
arative analysi
s
of
p
r
opo
sed
an
d existing sche
mes.
TBS
R
P
and
TARF
m
a
ke
use
of comp
osite
routin
g
metric whi
c
h
can
ada
pt
to
dynamic natu
re of
network. The p
r
op
osed
scheme i
n
curs low
routin
g
and net
work loads
as
co
mpared to ex
isting sch
e
m
e
s du
e to si
mple
and
ro
bu
st d
e
sig
n
without
involving to
o ma
ny
b
r
oa
dca
s
ts
an
d e
x
chan
ge of control
pa
cket
s.
Furthe
rmo
r
e,
propo
se
d scheme can al
so dete
c
t
faulty nodes re
spon
sible for
drop
ping p
a
ckets
due to sig
n
ificnalt level of conge
stion.
(a)
(b)
Figure 5. End-to-En
d
dela
y
performa
n
ce with malici
o
us an
d faulty node
s
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
TELKOM
NIKA
ISSN:
1693-6
9
30
Countering Node Misbehavior Attacks Usi
ng
Trust B
a
sed Secure
R
outing .... (Adnan Ahm
ed)
267
(a)
(b)
Figure 6. NRL perfo
rman
ce with malici
o
us an
d faulty node
s
Table 1. Co
m
parative Anal
ysis
TBSRP
TARF
TARP
AODV
Routing metric
Composite
Composite
Singular
Singular
Routing overhea
d
Lo
w
High
High
High
Net
w
ork Loa
d
Lo
w
Medium
High
High
Fault Detection
Y
e
s
No
No
No
5. Conclusio
n
In this p
ape
r,
we
propo
se
d a lig
htwei
g
ht and
re
adil
y
deployabl
e
Tru
s
t Ba
sed
Secu
re
Routin
g Prot
ocol
(TBSRP
)
for wi
rele
ss sen
s
o
r
net
work to i
s
olate
malicio
us a
nd faulty nod
es.
TBSRP can
also
re
-route
the pa
ckets to othe
r ro
u
t
es if e
s
tabli
s
he
d route e
n
co
unter pa
cket
forwa
r
di
ng m
i
sbe
havior d
ue to fa
ulty or
con
g
e
s
ted
nod
es. T
h
e
simul
a
tion
result
s p
r
ove
the
efficacy of p
r
opo
sed
sche
me. The p
e
rf
orma
nce of
TBSRP is
c
o
mpared ag
ains
t AODV in terms
of packet d
e
li
very ratio, av
erag
e en
d-to
-end d
e
lay an
d normali
zed
routing
load.
The
simulati
on
results
sho
w
that malicio
us
node
s ba
dly affect
the ove
r
all pe
rform
a
nce of AO
DV and b
r
ing d
o
w
n
the PDR
an
d throug
hput
to u
n
a
c
cept
able
ra
nge
s.
TBSRP
sig
n
ificantly im
p
r
oves the
ov
erall
netwo
rk p
e
rfo
r
man
c
e
an
d i
s
olate
s
mali
cious an
d f
ault
y
node
s
at e
a
r
liest. A
s
part
of future
wo
rk,
we
plan
to
compa
r
e th
e
perfo
rman
ce
of pro
p
o
s
ed
scheme
ag
ai
nst oth
e
r no
de mi
sbe
havi
o
r
attacks such as worm
hole
and Sybil attacks
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