Int
ern
at
i
onal
Journ
al of Ele
ctrical
an
d
Co
mput
er
En
gin
eeri
ng
(IJ
E
C
E)
Vo
l.
10
,
No.
4
,
A
ugus
t
2020
,
pp.
4053
~
40
72
IS
S
N: 20
88
-
8708
,
DOI: 10
.11
591/
ijece
.
v10
i
4
.
pp
4053
-
40
72
4053
Journ
al h
om
e
page
:
http:
//
ij
ece.i
aesc
or
e.c
om/i
nd
ex
.ph
p/IJ
ECE
Test
plat
form f
or electr
onic cont
rol un
its of high
-
pe
rform
ance
safety
-
cr
itical mu
lti actuat
or syst
em
s
Giovan
ni Buc
ci
, Fabriz
io C
iance
tta,
E
doa
rdo Fi
orucci,
Simone
Mari
Depa
rtment
o
f
I
ndustria
l
and
Inf
orm
at
ion
Eng
ineeri
ng
and Ec
ono
m
ic
s,
Univer
sit
y
of
L’Aqui
la,
I
tal
y
Art
ic
le
In
f
o
ABSTR
A
CT
Art
ic
le
history:
Re
cei
ved
J
un
10
, 2
019
Re
vised
Ma
r 5
,
2020
Accepte
d
Ma
r
15
, 202
0
In
thi
s
pape
r
we
are
m
ostl
y
concerne
d
with
the
p
roble
m
of
te
stin
g
el
e
ct
ron
i
c
cont
rol
uni
ts
of
s
y
nchr
oni
ze
d
el
ectri
c
power
ac
tuators.
Th
is
ta
sk
is
par
ticula
r
l
y
complex
for
safe
t
y
cri
tica
l
applicati
ons,
where
it
is
cru
cial
th
a
t
the
con
trol
s
y
s
tem
prope
rl
y
r
e
a
c
ts
in
response
to
the
fau
lt
s
that
are
har
d
to
rep
roduc
e
and
ver
if
y
.
A
cost
-
eff
ective
f
le
xib
l
e
and
rec
onf
ig
ura
ble
t
est
pla
tform
is
pr
oposed,
discussing
it
s
arc
hi
tectur
e
and
impl
ementa
t
ion
.
The
proposed
s
y
stem
fac
il
i
tates
t
he
phase
of
def
i
nit
ion
and
d
eve
l
opm
ent
of
the
el
e
ct
roni
c
c
ontrol
uni
t,
allo
wing
the
interfa
ci
ng
towar
ds
bo
th
h
y
dra
u
li
c
and
el
e
ct
rom
ec
h
ani
c
al
actua
tors
,
and
havi
ng
a
high
fle
xibilit
y
as
reg
ard
s
the
I/O
signal
s.
Som
e
result
s,
obta
in
ed
during
the
la
bor
at
or
y
te
st
activit
y
,
are
al
so pr
ese
nt
e
d.
Ke
yw
or
d
s
:
Mult
i act
uator
syst
e
m
Mult
it
hr
eadi
ng techn
i
qu
e
Synchr
onous
ha
nd
li
ng
Test
of elect
r
onic
contr
ol
un
it
(ECU
)
Copyright
©
202
0
Instit
ut
e
o
f Ad
vanc
ed
Engi
n
ee
r
ing
and
S
cienc
e
.
Al
l
rights re
serv
ed
.
Corres
pond
in
g
Aut
h
or
:
Ed
oardo Fio
r
uc
ci
,
Dep
a
rtm
ent o
f Ind
us
tria
l an
d I
nfor
m
at
ion
E
nginee
rin
g
a
nd
Eco
no
m
ic
s,
Un
i
ver
sit
y o
f L’A
quil
a,
Via G.
Gro
nchi
1
8 C
am
po
d
i
Pil
e 6
71
00, L
’
Aquila
,
Ital
y
.
Em
a
il
: edo
ar
do.f
io
ru
cci
@univ
aq.
it
1.
INTROD
U
CTION
Power
act
uato
rs
are
essenti
al
ly
s
yst
e
m
s
t
hat
prov
i
de
con
t
ro
ll
ed
m
ove
m
ents
or
posit
ion
in
g
in
respo
ns
e
t
o
a
c
on
t
ro
l
si
gn
al
.
They
em
bo
dy
m
oto
rs,
cy
li
nders,
or
oth
er
m
otion
de
vices
t
o
pro
du
ce
r
otati
on
s
or
li
near
translat
ion
s
of
a
n
obj
e
ct
.
The
m
echa
nical
com
po
n
e
nts
of
the
pow
er
transm
issi
on
co
nn
ect
the
act
uato
r
to
the
sh
i
fted
obj
ect
.
As
the
proces
s
in
dus
try
co
ntinu
e
s
t
o
ac
hieve
m
or
e
eff
ic
ie
nt
an
d
pro
duct
ive
plant,
new
act
uato
rs
are
desig
ne
d
an
d
ap
plie
d
(e.
g.
pac
ka
ging
m
achines,
pro
duct
io
n
m
achiner
y,
et
c.).
Ma
n
y
act
uators
are
ap
plied
in
m
edical
eq
uip
m
ent,
auto
m
ot
ive
and
ae
ro
s
pace
syst
e
m
s,
and
even
in
ci
vil
eng
i
neer
i
ng to m
ov
e large
s
ur
faces
(e.
g.
rive
r
fl
ow b
a
rr
ie
rs, r
oof
se
gm
ents o
f
a stadi
um
).
Re
gardin
g
the
ty
pe
of
powe
r
act
uato
r,
it
is
possible
to
i
den
ti
fy
tw
o
m
ai
n
cat
eg
or
ie
s
of
syst
em
s:
pr
ess
uri
zed
fl
uid
a
nd
el
ect
r
ic
m
oto
r.
I
n
the
rece
nt
ye
ar
s,
m
any
co
m
pan
ie
s
are
m
oving
to
wards
el
ect
ric
act
uator
s
,
wh
i
ch
s
how
gr
eat
ad
van
ta
ges:
(
i)
re
du
ct
io
n
of
co
sts
an
d
dim
ension
s
due
to
the
a
bs
e
nc
e
of
add
it
io
nal
flui
d
po
wer
s
up
plies;
(ii)
great
er
eff
ic
ie
ncy;
(iii
)
gr
eat
e
r
res
ponse
sp
ee
d;
(iv
)
r
edu
ce
d
m
ai
ntenan
ce
pro
blem
s
and
fire
haza
r
ds
.
I
n
r
e
c
e
n
t
y
e
a
r
s
t
h
e
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
o
f
e
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
a
l
a
c
t
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
h
a
s
d
r
i
v
e
n
t
h
e
t
e
n
d
e
n
c
y
t
o
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
t
h
e
h
y
d
r
a
u
l
i
c
d
e
v
i
c
e
s
h
i
t
h
e
r
t
o
u
s
e
d
i
n
a
w
i
d
e
r
a
n
g
e
o
f
a
i
r
c
r
a
f
t
a
e
r
o
d
y
n
a
m
i
c
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
u
r
f
a
c
e
s
(
r
u
d
d
e
r
s
,
a
i
l
e
r
o
n
s
,
h
o
r
i
z
o
n
t
a
l
s
t
a
b
i
l
i
z
e
r
s
o
r
f
l
a
p
s
)
,
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
a
i
m
o
f
c
o
n
v
e
r
g
i
n
g
t
o
t
h
e
a
l
l
-
e
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
a
i
r
c
r
a
f
t
[
1
]
.
Du
e
to
the
li
m
i
te
d
torsional
ri
gid
it
y
of
the
m
ov
i
ng
dev
ic
e
,
in
so
m
e
app
li
cat
ion
s
m
or
e
ac
tuato
rs
w
ork
tog
et
he
r
to
pos
it
ion
it
,
sh
ari
ng
the
loa
d.
In
oth
e
r
cases,
th
ere
are
tw
o
or
m
or
e
axes
of
m
ot
ion
(
ei
the
r
work
i
ng
ind
e
pende
ntly
or
m
ov
ing
to
ge
ther)
that
m
us
t
be
c
oor
din
at
e
d
(m
ulti
-
axis
synch
ronizat
ion)
s
uch
as
for
pri
ntin
g
pr
ess
es,
X
YZ
m
achines
an
d
rob
ots.
Mult
iple
el
ect
ric
act
ua
tors
are
ap
plie
d
in
industry,
f
or
exam
ple
for
dr
ive
wh
eel
s
th
at
ar
e
par
t
of
the
sam
e
asse
m
bly
li
ne
(in
-
wh
e
el
te
chn
ol
og
y
)
;
they
are
al
so
us
ed
on
cars
[2
]
or
bu
s
es
[
3
-
5].
T
he
con
t
ro
l of
t
he
high
-
pr
e
ci
sion
m
ov
em
ent
of
t
he
c
oo
per
at
in
g
act
uators
is
a
r
at
her
d
iffic
ult
ta
sk
.
Wh
e
n
se
ve
ral
act
uato
rs
m
ov
e
the
sam
e
platfo
rm
,
the
synch
ronizat
io
n
of
posit
ion
s
an
d
s
peeds
m
us
t
be
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
IS
S
N
:
2088
-
8708
In
t J
Elec
&
C
om
p
En
g,
V
ol.
10
, No
.
4
,
A
ugus
t
2020
:
4053
-
4072
4054
achieve
d
with
pr
eci
sio
n,
i
n
or
der
to
acc
urat
el
y
determ
ine
its
pro
gr
essi
on
over
ti
m
e
[6
]
.
These
as
pects
ar
e
a
lso
i
m
po
rtant
for
t
win
par
al
le
l
operati
ng
act
uator
s
t
hat
eq
uall
y
div
ide
t
he
lo
ad
betwee
n
th
e
m
to
el
i
m
inate
any
force
fig
hting.
I
n
s
o
m
e
c
r
i
t
i
c
a
l
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
a
f
t
e
r
a
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
o
f
t
h
e
p
o
w
e
r
s
u
p
p
l
y
o
r
a
c
t
u
a
t
o
r
,
t
h
e
a
c
t
u
a
t
o
r
c
o
n
c
e
r
n
e
d
m
u
s
t
b
e
c
o
n
f
i
g
u
r
e
d
i
n
a
p
a
s
s
i
v
e
d
a
m
p
i
n
g
m
o
d
e
,
t
h
u
s
r
e
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
i
n
g
t
h
e
s
h
a
r
i
n
g
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
o
f
t
h
e
l
o
a
d
[
7
]
.
In
these
ad
va
nc
ed
syst
em
s
the
posit
ion
,
ve
l
ocity
,
acce
le
rati
on
an
d
f
orce/
torque
are
con
t
ro
ll
ed
as
a
functi
on
of
ti
m
e,
fo
ll
ow
i
ng
a
require
d
ta
rget
pr
ofi
le
:
the
act
ual
values
de
riv
e
d
from
the
feedbac
k
sen
so
r
a
re
com
par
ed
wit
h
tho
se
of
the
m
otion
prof
il
e,
to
gu
ide
th
e
act
uator
co
r
rectl
y.
Also
th
e
cl
os
el
y
con
nected
act
uator
s
m
us
t
al
l
be
in
the
sa
m
e
sta
te
a
t
al
l
tim
es,
acce
le
rati
ng
,
de
cel
erati
ng
an
d
stoppin
g
toge
ther.
Fu
rt
her
m
or
e,
if
o
ne
act
uato
r
stop
s
due
to
a
f
a
ult,
the
ot
her
m
us
t
al
so
stop
.
The
pe
rfo
rm
a
nce
of
these
ac
tuator
s
dep
e
nds
m
or
e
on
t
he
co
ord
inati
on
of
m
ulti
ple
m
otion
act
uator
s
t
han
on
i
nd
i
vidual
act
uator
be
havi
our
s
.
Mult
i
-
act
uator
syst
e
m
s
wit
h
go
od
s
pee
d
trackin
g
an
d
synch
r
oniz
at
ion
perf
or
m
ance
require
el
e
ct
ronic
coor
din
at
in
g,
m
on
it
or
ing
an
d
c
on
t
ro
l
unit
s
capa
ble
of
pre
ci
sel
y
con
tr
olli
ng
both
the
po
sit
ion
a
nd
the
app
li
e
d
force
[
8].
Si
nc
e
com
plex
syst
e
m
s
m
ay
le
ad
t
o
fail
ure
a
nd
losses,
hi
gh
int
egr
it
y
an
d
fail
ur
e
survi
val
ca
pa
bili
ty
are
fr
e
qu
e
ntly
require
d
(e.
g.
a
ct
uation
f
or
fli
gh
t
co
ntr
ol).
R
edun
dan
ci
es
a
nd
fa
ult
detect
ion
s
ar
e
im
ple
m
ented
to
quic
kly
detect
a
fa
ult,
in
order
to
a
void
syst
e
m
fail
ur
e
s.
Va
rio
us
te
c
hn
i
qu
e
s
are
im
plem
ented,
bas
ed
on
hard
war
e
re
dund
a
ncies
(se
nsors
,
act
uat
ors,
co
ntr
ollers)
[
9
-
13]
or
on
a
ct
uator
m
od
el
ing
an
d
pa
ram
et
er
est
i
m
ation
[10]. T
hese a
dd
it
io
nal co
m
pone
nts incr
ea
se the
c
om
plexity
o
f
t
he
act
uat
or co
nt
ro
ll
ers.
In
the
pa
st
the
te
st
of
each
ind
ivid
ual
act
uat
or
re
presente
d
the
m
os
t
dem
a
nd
i
ng
te
st
act
ivit
y.
Tod
ay
these
te
sts
ar
e
par
t
of
r
ou
ti
ne
act
ivit
ie
s
an
d
are
de
fi
ned
in
detai
l
by
s
pecific
sta
nd
a
rds.
C
urre
ntly
the
assessm
ent
of
the
el
ect
r
onic
co
ntr
ol
uni
ts
(ECUs
)
repr
esents
the
m
ai
n
te
st
act
ivit
y.
As
t
he
co
ntr
ol
le
rs
grow
in
c
om
plexity
,
even
the
te
s
ti
ng
chall
eng
e
s
[14
-
19]
.
Test
ing
act
ivit
ie
s
fo
r
th
e
co
ntro
ll
er
are
par
ti
cularly
exp
e
ns
i
ve,
due
to
the
high
functi
onal
de
ns
it
y
and
the
num
ero
us
de
gr
ees
of
f
ree
dom
in
the
co
ntr
oller
config
ur
at
io
n.
Their
perf
orm
ance
m
us
t
be
validat
ed
against
al
l
operati
ng
c
on
diti
on
s
of
the
act
uator.
Most
com
m
on
ly
,
this
will
include
posit
ion
and
l
oad
co
ntr
ol
thr
ough
the
com
plete
strok
e
of
the
a
ct
ua
tor
a
t
bo
t
h
m
ini
m
u
m
and
m
axim
u
m
sp
eeds.
Furt
her
m
or
e,
t
he
I
/O
sig
nal
m
an
agem
ent
sect
ion
m
us
t
be
eva
luate
d.
Since
c
omm
u
nicat
ion
i
nter
f
aces
al
so
play
an
im
po
rtant
ro
le
,
it
is
ne
cessary
to
ca
r
ry
out
te
sts
to
ver
ify
the
correct
fun
ct
ion
in
g
of
the
basic
and
re
dunda
nt
com
m
u
nicat
ion
syst
em
.
In
safety
-
cr
it
ic
al
app
li
cat
ion
s
it
is
essenti
al
that
the
co
ntr
ol
syst
e
m
reacts
cor
re
ct
ly
in
resp
ons
e
t
o
fau
lt
s.
T
o
t
est
these
co
nd
i
ti
on
s,
th
e
te
st
syst
e
m
m
us
t
be
able
to
e
m
ulate
var
io
us
erro
r
sit
uations.
Exte
nsi
ve
te
sts
in
t
hese
at
ypic
al
conditi
ons
are
ver
y
i
m
po
rtant,
also
b
eca
us
e
fail
ure eve
nts r
a
rely
occur,
and t
herefo
re a
re
diff
ic
ult t
o rep
rod
uc
e an
d ve
rify.
In
t
his
pa
per
w
e
pro
po
se
d
a
c
os
t
-
e
ff
ect
ive
te
st
platfo
rm
fo
r
the
aut
om
at
ed
te
sti
ng
of
EC
U
s.
To
m
eet
the
te
st
re
quire
m
ents
of
a
m
ulti
-
act
uator
syst
e
m
,
the
te
st
s
yst
e
m
is
able
to
sim
ultaneous
ly
te
st
a
num
ber
of
interco
nnect
ed
sync
hron
iz
e
d
el
ect
ric
act
u
at
or
s
.
T
he
pro
pose
d
te
st
ben
c
h
is
base
d
on
the
N
I
c
om
pact
RI
O
(cRI
O)
syst
em
,
an
ad
va
nced
e
m
bed
de
d
c
on
t
ro
l
an
d
data
ac
qu
isi
ti
on
syst
em
.
This
te
st
ben
ch
is
a
flexi
ble
and
reconfi
gura
ble test
p
la
tfor
m
, s
uitable
f
or a w
ide r
an
ge
of ap
plica
ti
on
s and p
er
form
ance
req
ui
rem
ents.
The
te
st
platfo
rm
is
able
to
gen
e
rate
al
l
the
sign
al
s
require
d
by
the
ECU,
bo
th
as
el
ect
rical
I/O
sig
na
ls
and
a
s
com
m
un
ic
at
ion
buses.
A
PC
connecte
d
to
t
he
syst
e
m
act
s
as
the
m
ai
n
actu
at
ion
c
on
t
ro
ll
er
an
d
us
er
int
erf
ace.
The pr
opose
d s
yst
e
m
is scal
able, b
ase
d o
n
th
e num
ber
of E
CUs.
Using
the
pro
pose
d
m
od
ular
syst
e
m
,
it
is
po
ssible
to
te
st
ECU
f
or
c
omm
ercial
ly
availab
le
el
ect
ric
act
uator
s;
besi
des,
it
is
possi
ble
to
ef
fici
ent
ly
perform
fu
nc
ti
on
al
te
sts
of
the
ECU
duri
ng
the
early
st
ages
of
de
vel
op
m
ent.
I
t
can
al
so
ea
sil
y
ver
ify
stric
t
qu
al
it
y
com
pli
ance.
A
n
im
po
rtant
te
st
f
or
m
ulti
act
uator
syst
e
m
s
is
that
relat
ed
to
the
c
orrect
f
un
ct
io
ning
of
t
he
com
m
un
ic
at
ion
inter
faces.
A
key
c
halle
nge
f
or
te
sti
ng
s
afety
-
crit
ic
al
syst
e
m
s is the
posit
io
n
syn
ch
ronizat
ion t
est
for t
he
t
rack
i
ng er
ror m
easur
em
ent.
Our
pro
posal
is
essenti
al
ly
mo
ti
vated
by
the
i
m
po
ssibil
it
y
of
fi
nd
i
ng
s
pec
ific
te
st
sys
tems
fo
r
the
se
ty
pes
of
a
ppli
cat
ion
s
on
t
he
m
ark
et
.
F
ur
th
erm
or
e,
sim
i
la
r
te
st
syst
em
s
do
not
ap
pea
r
to
be
descr
i
be
d
in
the
rece
nt
bib
l
iograp
hy.
So
m
e
te
st
de
vices
are
c
omm
ercial
ly
avail
able,
bu
t
sp
eci
fical
l
y
for
te
sti
ng
c
on
t
ro
l
un
it
s
f
or
inter
nal
com
bu
sti
on
en
gine
s
the
pro
po
se
d
te
st
platfo
rm
is
cost
-
eff
ect
iv
e
be
cause
it
is
bas
ed
on
com
m
ercial
ly
avail
able
instr
um
ents.
It
pro
vid
es
a
n
intuit
i
ve
en
vir
on
m
en
t
fo
r
ge
ner
at
in
g
te
st
prof
il
es,
al
arm
s
,
us
er
inter
face
an
d
data
ac
qu
isi
ti
on.
I
n
t
he
fo
ll
owin
g
sect
ion
s
we
will
discu
ss
t
he
a
rch
it
ect
ur
e
an
d
i
m
ple
m
entat
io
n of t
he
te
st
pl
at
fo
rm
. F
urt
he
r
m
or
e, the
re
su
l
ts of the la
bora
tory t
est
s ar
e
presente
d.
2.
THE
R
EFE
R
ENCE
A
RCH
IT
ECTU
RE
OF THE
HIG
H
-
PE
RFO
R
MAN
CE
MUL
TI AC
T
U
A
TOR
SY
STE
M
The
syst
em
ta
k
en
as
a
re
fer
e
nc
e
is
an
ad
vanced
an
d
r
el
ia
ble
m
ulti
act
uator
syst
e
m
with
a
nu
m
ber
of
ind
e
pende
nt
act
uator
s
,
ar
ranged
t
o
track
the
desire
d
tr
ajecto
ries
w
hil
e
keep
in
g
th
ei
r
sp
ee
d
the
sa
m
e.
As
is norm
al
l
y
the case, a
m
ov
em
ent co
ntro
l
co
m
pu
te
r
(MCC
),
interf
ace
d
with the ope
r
at
or
, s
e
nds com
m
and
s
to
a
s
up
e
r
visor
el
ect
ronic
co
nt
ro
l
un
it
(
SEC
U)
.
T
h
e
S
E
C
U
i
n
t
e
r
f
a
c
e
s
s
o
m
e
e
l
e
c
t
r
o
n
i
c
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
u
n
i
t
s
(
E
C
U
s
)
,
e
a
c
h
o
f
w
h
i
c
h
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
s
a
s
s
y
s
t
e
m
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
r
f
o
r
t
h
e
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
e
l
e
c
t
r
o
-
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
c
a
l
a
c
t
u
a
t
o
r
(
E
M
A
)
,
a
s
s
h
o
w
n
i
n
F
i
g
u
r
e
1
.
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
In
t J
Elec
&
C
om
p
En
g
IS
S
N: 20
88
-
8708
Test pl
atform f
or
elec
tro
nic c
on
tr
ol
un
it
s
of
high
-
perfo
rm
ance s
afety
…
(
Giov
anni B
ucc
i
)
4055
M
C
C
SE
C
U
E
C
U
1
E
M
A
1
E
C
U
2
E
M
A
2
E
C
U
3
E
M
A
3
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
ed
s
u
r
f
a
c
e
Figure
1. A
rch
i
te
c
ture of a m
ulti
actuat
or
syst
e
m
The
MC
C
rece
ives
an
d
proce
sses
SEC
U’
s
da
ta
and
opera
t
or
i
nputs,
i
n
or
der
t
o
m
on
it
or
and
co
ntr
ol
the
act
uator
s
.
ECUs
are
esse
ntial
ly
e
m
bed
ded
de
vices
that
com
m
un
ic
at
e
with
the
SECU
in
order
to
interac
t
and
c
oor
din
at
e
their
beh
a
vi
our
.
More
in
de
ta
il
,
the
SECU
m
anag
es
the
MC
C
co
m
mands,
set
s
the
EMAs
op
e
rati
ng
m
ode,
co
ntr
ols
the
po
sit
io
n
a
nd
spe
ed
of
w
ho
le
s
urface,
a
nd
dis
tribu
te
s
t
he
loa
d
set
ti
ng
the
force
a
t
each
act
uat
or
.
Each
EC
U
rec
ei
ves
com
m
and
s
f
ro
m
SECU
,
pe
rfor
m
s
the
EMA
cl
os
e
-
lo
op
posit
ion
c
ontr
ol,
and
ret
urns
m
easur
em
ent
da
ta
(inclu
ding
po
sit
io
n
from
a
dual
L
VDT
an
d
force)
to
the
SECU
.
Wh
il
e
the
SEC
U
ca
n
be
loc
at
ed
a
wa
y,
the
EC
U
res
ides
cl
ose
to
or
are
m
ounted
on
the
act
uat
or,
to
bette
r
pr
ov
i
de
for
it
s local co
ntr
ol
.
In
s
om
e
safety
crit
ic
al
app
li
cat
ion
s,
eac
h
ac
tuator
is
c
on
t
r
olled
by
a
different
SEC
U,
s
o
the
lo
ss
of
a
sin
gle
act
uat
or,
or
of
a
SE
CU,
will
not
m
ean
the
over
al
l
con
tr
ol
lo
s
s
of
the
s
urfac
e.
Eac
h
EC
U
i
s
the
n
c
onnected
to
a
n
associat
ed
S
ECU
as
sh
ow
n
in
Figure
2,
a
SECU
fau
lt
causes
the
out
of
serv
ic
e
of
j
us
t
an
act
uato
r,
th
at
can
be
pu
t
in
the
anti
-
j
am
m
ing
conditi
on.
I
n
this
way
the
oth
er
act
ua
tors
can
sti
ll
m
ov
e
the
co
ntro
ll
e
d
su
r
face
in
a
safe
posit
ion,
even
t
hough
operati
ng
wit
h
reduce
d
pe
rform
ance.
All
S
ECUs
op
e
rate i
n pa
ra
ll
el
, s
o
the
re is
no sw
it
c
hing
de
la
y. The dat
a
li
nk
MC
C
–
S
ECU i
s als
o dupli
cat
ed.
Be
sides,
in
reli
able
syst
e
m
s
a
pro
gnos
ti
c
m
o
nitor
i
ng
syst
e
m
(P
MS)
is
re
qu
i
red,
in
or
de
r
to
pe
rfo
rm
s
the
diag
no
sis
of
the
act
uator
a
nd
e
valuate
it
s
reli
abili
ty
,
al
so
in
te
r
m
s
of
li
f
e
exp
ect
ancy.
The
PMS,
em
bo
die
d
in
the
el
ect
r
onic
co
ntr
o
l
an
d
m
on
it
or
ing
uni
ts
(ECMU
),
c
ontr
ols
an
d
a
nal
yse
s
the
act
ua
tor
sta
tus,
sta
rin
g
from
act
uator
par
am
et
ers
ev
olu
ti
on
an
d
se
nsor
si
gnal
b
e
hav
i
our.
The
SEC
U
obt
ai
ns
ECM
U’s s
ens
or
m
easur
e
m
ent
s
and m
on
it
or
in
g res
ults thr
ough the
ECM
U
-
S
ECU c
omm
un
i
cat
ion
li
nk.
A
s
well
as
the
ben
e
fit
of
ve
ry
hig
h
reli
abili
t
y,
the
SECU
re
dundancy
al
lo
ws
the
overall
functi
onal
it
y
of
SECU
to
be
inclu
ded
in
t
he
relat
ed
ECM
U
(
just
a
si
ng
l
e
ap
par
at
us
)
,
r
edu
ci
ng
s
o
the
hard
war
e
dim
e
ns
io
ns
and
costs
.
A
fa
ult
-
tolera
nt
arc
hitec
ture
was
i
m
pl
e
m
ented
by
rep
li
cat
ing
th
e
SECU
an
d
i
m
ple
m
enting
t
he
ri
ng
arch
it
ect
ure
show
n
in
Fig
ur
e
2,
wh
e
re
eac
h
SECU
is
li
nke
d
with
t
wo
othe
r
SEC
Us.
T
hi
s
arch
it
ect
ure
m
akes
po
s
sible
to
s
har
e
in
form
ation
(
SECU
’s
internal
sta
tus
an
d
co
nn
ect
ed
ECM
U
internal
sta
tus
an
d
m
easur
em
ents)
with
the
tw
o
oth
e
r
SECU
s
li
nk
e
d
in
the
ri
ng
c
hain
.
The
connecti
on
Ne
xt
SECU
-
Pr
e
viou
s
SECU
is
i
m
ple
m
ented
us
in
g
a
pr
ivate
li
nk,
to
a
vo
i
d
any
la
te
ncy
fo
r
m
essage
tran
sm
issi
on
an
d
sen
de
r
identific
at
ion.
In
case
of
an
E
CM
U
or
EMA
fail
ur
e,
t
he
as
so
ci
at
ed
SEC
U
pu
ts
t
he
fail
ed
act
uator
i
n
fai
l
-
safe
m
od
e
and
sig
nals
this
eve
nt
to
the
oth
e
r
SECUs.
In
t
his
way,
the
co
ntr
olled
surfac
e
can
be
m
oved
by
the o
t
her act
ua
tors, eve
n
i
f wit
h
re
duced
m
ec
han
ic
al
perf
orm
ances.
Con
si
der
i
ng th
e syst
e
m
sh
ow
n
in
Fig
ure
2,
t
he
m
ai
n
MC
C op
e
rati
ng tas
ks are:
-
Creat
ion
of a
posit
ion vs
. Tim
e pro
file
;
-
Sendin
g
the
r
el
at
ed
set
-
posit
ion
fr
am
e to the se
cus;
-
Sendin
g
s
pecif
ic
ec
m
u
co
ntr
ol
co
m
m
and
s t
o t
he
sec
us
;
-
Re
cei
vin
g an
d processi
ng of s
ecus i
ntern
al
stat
e;
-
Re
cei
vin
g an
d processi
ng of e
c
m
us
inter
nal s
ta
te
.
The
sec
u
ta
s
ks
are instea
d:
-
Re
cei
vin
g t
he se
t
-
posit
ion f
ra
m
e fr
om
m
cc;
-
Sendin
g
the
set
-
posit
ion f
ram
e
to
the
ecm
u;
-
Re
cei
vin
g (c
on
ti
nu
ously
)
t
he m
easur
em
ent f
ram
e fr
om
ec
m
u;
-
Re
cei
vin
g
the
po
sit
ion
m
ea
su
rem
e
nts
fr
om
two
li
near
disp
la
cem
ent
t
ran
s
ducers
(l
vdts)
co
nnect
ed
to
the ecm
u;
-
Re
cei
vin
g an
d sen
ding to
m
cc
the inte
rn
al
sta
tus
of
t
he
ass
oc
ia
te
d
ecm
u;
-
Checki
ng the s
ta
tus of othe
r
a
ct
uator
s;
-
Ena
bling t
he
e
c
m
u
operati
ng
m
od
e, u
si
ng d
e
dicat
e d
i
gital
outp
uts;
-
Checki
ng the e
c
m
u
sta
te
v
ia
a
d
e
dicat
e d
i
gital
input.
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
IS
S
N
:
2088
-
8708
In
t J
Elec
&
C
om
p
En
g,
V
ol.
10
, No
.
4
,
A
ugus
t
2020
:
4053
-
4072
4056
M
C
C
SE
C
U
2
E
C
MU
1
E
M
A
1
E
C
MU
2
E
C
MU
3
SE
C
U
3
SE
C
U
1
B
a
l
l
s
c
r
e
w
M
o
to
r
E
M
A
2
B
a
l
l
s
c
r
e
w
M
o
to
r
E
M
A
3
B
a
l
l
s
c
r
e
w
M
o
to
r
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
ed
s
u
r
f
a
c
e
P
r
e
v
N
e
x
t
P
r
e
v
N
e
x
t
P
r
e
v
N
e
x
t
A
n
ti
J
A
n
ti
J
A
n
ti
J
D
u
a
l
L
V
D
T
Figure
2. A
rch
i
te
ct
ur
e
of
a re
dunda
nt m
ulti
a
ct
uator syst
em
(ECMU: EC
U
+PM
S)
2.1.
The referenc
e
a
c
tuat
or
c
ont
rol and
mo
nit
oring uni
t
(E
CMU) un
der
t
est
The
im
ple
m
ented
te
s
t
platf
orm
has
bee
n
dev
el
op
e
d
f
or
te
st
ing
t
he
c
on
t
ro
ll
ers
(EC
MUs)
f
or
high
-
perf
or
m
a
nce
act
uat
or
s
.
The
s
urface
is
power
e
d
by
so
m
e
i
nd
e
pe
nd
e
nt
a
ct
uator
s
t
hat
op
e
rate
synch
ron
ously
.
Af
te
r
a
pow
er
supp
ly
or
act
uator
fail
ure
the
aff
ect
ed
act
uator
is
pl
aced
into
a
pa
ssive
Dam
pin
g
m
ode
in
wh
ic
h
it
is
no
t
c
ontr
olled
in
posit
ion
cl
os
e
lo
op
a
ny
m
or
e.
T
her
e
fore,
t
his
act
ua
tor
i
s
con
t
ro
ll
ed
to
a
ct
as
a
da
m
per
in
wh
ic
h
the
force
is
a
func
ti
on
of
the
sp
e
ed
im
po
sed
by
the
oth
er
act
ua
tors.
This
m
od
e
of
op
e
rati
on
is
possibl
e
tha
nks
to
the
re
ver
si
bl
e
capa
bili
ty
of
act
uator
with
a
low
bac
kdrive
force
.
In this
way, th
e act
uato
r
ca
n
i
m
po
se the fo
rc
e re
qu
ire
d
t
o
a
vo
i
d
a
ny s
urfa
ce flat
te
rin
g.
A
sti
ff
e
r
act
uat
or
fail
ur
e
or
a
SECU
fail
ur
e
can
pr
oduce
a
m
echan
ic
al
loc
k
that
pre
ven
ts
the
sh
a
ft
to
ro
ta
te
(
j
am
m
ing
e
ven
t)
,
s
o
th
ere
is
a
po
sit
ion
er
ror
that
c
annot
be
aut
om
at
ic
ally
co
m
pensat
ed.
I
n
th
is
case
the
arise
of
a
n
i
m
balance
of
f
or
ce
ca
n
dam
age
the
syst
em
.
In
case
of
a
no
n
-
recove
rab
le
f
ai
lure
(e.
g.
a
br
ok
e
n
-
too
th
i
n
a
gea
r)
,
t
he
previ
ous
(in
the
ri
ng
chain
)
SECU
pu
ts
the
fail
ed
act
uator
in
t
he
anti
-
j
am
m
in
g
(
AJ
)
m
od
e,
to
pr
e
ve
nt
any
possible
m
al
fu
nctio
n.
The
A
J
syst
e
m
is
gen
erall
y
lo
cat
ed
inside
th
e
screw
a
nd
m
ai
nly
al
lows
disc
onne
ct
ing
t
he
act
ua
tor
from
the
s
urface,
kee
ping
the
con
t
ro
l
by
the
oth
er
act
uato
rs.
The
Fai
l
-
Safe
is
a
featur
e
t
ha
t,
in
the
e
ve
nt
of
a
s
pecific
ty
pe
of
fail
ure,
in
herentl
y
respo
n
ds
in
a
way
that
will
caus
e
m
ini
m
al
har
m
to
oth
er
e
qu
i
pm
ent,
or
to
people.
W
h
e
n
i
n
t
h
e
F
a
i
l
-
S
a
f
e
m
o
d
e
,
t
h
e
S
E
C
U
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
s
i
n
o
r
d
e
r
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
i
n
g
t
h
e
A
J
i
f
n
e
e
d
e
d
,
p
u
t
t
i
n
g
i
n
d
a
m
p
i
n
g
t
h
e
f
a
i
l
e
d
a
c
t
u
a
t
o
r
s
a
n
d
m
o
v
i
n
g
t
h
e
s
u
r
f
a
c
e
t
o
t
h
e
h
o
m
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
.
The Fi
gure
3
s
hows
t
he
sta
te
diag
ram
o
f
a ty
pical
ECM
U; t
he
sta
te
s a
re:
a)
Off
mode:
T
hi
s
is
the
sta
te
a
ssu
m
ed
by
the
syst
e
m
a
t
the
sta
rt
up
.
When
in
this
m
od
e,
the
ECM
U
do
es
no
t
sen
d data a
nd ig
nores
al
l
r
ecei
ved
fram
es
.
b)
Pre
-
R
un
m
od
e:
afte
r
t
he
s
ta
rt
-
up
t
he
E
CM
U
exec
ut
e
s
so
m
e
te
sts
to
c
hec
k
th
e
rig
ht
a
nd
f
ull
functi
onal
it
y, and the
n
sta
rts
s
end
i
ng d
at
a,
but i
gnor
es
all
r
e
cei
ved
data.
c)
Ru
n
(
Normal)
mode
:
the
EC
MU
pro
vid
es
t
he
surfa
ce
pos
it
ion
co
ntr
ol
accor
ding
to
t
he
SECU
re
que
st,
the ECM
U
p
e
r
form
s the f
ollo
wing tas
ks
:
-
D
am
ping:
t
he EC
MU does
not co
ntr
ol the
posit
ion
;
-
Perf
ormin
g
Co
ntro
l
: t
he
ECM
U
c
on
t
ro
ls t
he po
sit
io
n;
-
Homin
g
:
the
ECM
U
pe
rform
s
a
po
sit
ion
con
t
ro
l
to
wa
r
ds
a
pr
e
deter
m
ined
re
fer
e
nc
ed
(
hom
e)
po
sit
io
n.
d)
Anti
-
Ja
m
ming
mode
:
w
he
n
a
j
am
m
ing
co
nd
i
ti
on
is
detect
ed,
the
AJ
proc
edure
is
act
iva
te
d
disen
ga
ging
the EMA
(
t
he EC
MU does
not co
ntr
ol the
posit
ion);
e)
Fail
-
Safe
m
ode
:
after
a
fail
ur
e
detect
ion
th
e
act
uator
is
put
in
dam
pin
g
m
od
e
(
the
E
CM
U
do
es
no
t
con
t
ro
l t
he po
s
it
ion
).
f)
Mainte
nance
mode
:
durin
g
this
m
od
e
the
cal
ib
rati
on
,
c
onfig
ur
at
io
n
a
nd
m
ai
ntenan
c
e
op
erati
ons
a
re
perform
ed.
The
ECM
U
is
connecte
d t
o t
he
SECU
w
it
h:
1)
Tw
o
RS
-
48
5
li
nk
s
(o
ne fo
r re
cei
vin
g set
-
pos
it
ion
fram
es, the
oth
e
r for se
ndin
g
m
easur
em
ent fram
es);
2)
Digital
I/O
sig
nals:
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
In
t J
Elec
&
C
om
p
En
g
IS
S
N: 20
88
-
8708
Test pl
atform f
or
elec
tro
nic c
on
tr
ol
un
it
s
of
high
-
perfo
rm
ance s
afety
…
(
Giov
anni B
ucc
i
)
4057
a)
ECM
U
in
puts:
-
En
ab
le
:
is
act
i
ve
when
the
S
ECU
pu
ts
the
ECM
U
in
c
on
t
ro
l
posit
ion
(
e
nable
st
ate
ON
)
or
i
n
dam
pin
g
sta
te
(
en
able
state
O
FF
);
-
Homin
g
: i
s acti
ve wh
e
n
t
he
S
ECU
requires
to pu
t t
he
act
uator in t
he ho
m
e p
os
it
io
n;
-
Anti
-
Ja
m
ming
E:
is
a
ct
ive
when
t
he
S
ECU
e
nab
le
s
the
AJ
m
od
e
of
the
E
CM
U
ass
ociat
ed
with
the SEC
U_N.
b)
ECM
U
out
pu
ts
:
-
Rea
dy
: act
ive
wh
e
n
t
he
ECM
U
is i
n
Re
ady
m
od
e;
-
Ru
n
: act
ive
when
the
ECM
U
is in R
un m
od
e.
ECM
U
c
onnec
ti
on
ov
e
r
view a
s sho
wn in
Figur
e
4.
Figure
3. Stat
e
and tra
ns
it
ion
diag
ram
relat
e
d
to
the
ECM
U
und
e
r
te
st
Figur
e
4. ECM
U
c
onnecti
on
over
view
E
C
M
U
O
F
F
P
re
-
R
un
M
o
de
1
D
a
m
pi
ng
7
P
e
rf
o
rm
i
n
g
C
o
nt
ro
l
3
2
N
o
r
m
al
M
o
d
e
8
4
F
ai
l
-
S
afe
M
o
d
e
A
nt
i
-
J
a
m
m
i
n
g
M
o
d
e
5
6
9
9
H
o
m
i
n
g
S
E
C
U
1
E
x
S
y
s
R
S
4
8
5
U
S
B
-
6008
S
E
C
U
2
E
x
S
y
s
R
S
4
8
5
U
S
B
-
6008
E
C
MU
1
E
C
MU
2
RS
4
8
5
R
S
4
8
5
E
N
A
B
L
E
H
O
M
I
N
G
RE
A
D
Y
RU
N
A
J
E
R
S
4
8
5
RS
4
8
5
E
N
A
B
L
E
H
O
M
I
N
G
R
E
A
D
Y
R
U
N
A
J
E
S
Y
S
Y
T
E
M
U
N
D
E
R
T
E
S
T
T
E
S
T
P
L
A
T
F
O
RM
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
IS
S
N
:
2088
-
8708
In
t J
Elec
&
C
om
p
En
g,
V
ol.
10
, No
.
4
,
A
ugus
t
2020
:
4053
-
4072
4
058
The
ECM
U
e
xe
cutes these
m
ai
n
ta
sk
s:
a)
Re
cepti
on
of t
he
set
-
posit
ion
fr
am
e fr
om
the
asso
ci
at
ed
SE
CU;
b)
Gen
e
rati
on
of
an
inte
rn
al
pos
it
ion
that li
nea
r
ly
f
ollo
ws
the
s
et
-
posit
ion
s
g
i
ven b
y
SECU;
c)
Exec
ution
of t
he posi
ti
on
c
on
trol lo
op;
d)
Me
asur
em
ent
of the m
oto
r c
ontr
olled s
urfac
e
posit
ion (tw
o
lvd
ts
);
e)
Me
asur
em
ent
of the m
oto
r a
ngula
r po
sit
io
n (
reso
l
ver);
f)
Me
asur
em
ent
of the m
oto
r
te
m
per
at
ur
e (t
wo Pt1
00 tra
ns
du
cers)
;
g)
Me
asur
em
ent
of the m
oto
r
t
orq
ue (tw
o
strai
n gauges
);
h)
Me
asur
em
ent
of the accel
e
rati
on
(tw
o
tra
nsd
ucer
s
) for t
he p
rog
no
sti
c syst
e
m
;
i)
Transm
issi
on
of the
m
easur
em
ent f
ram
es to th
e S
ECU;
j)
Chan
ge
of it
s s
ta
te
w
he
n req
ui
red
by the
SE
CU;
k)
Sett
ing
of the
di
gital
o
ut
pu
t si
gn
al
s
b
ase
d o
n i
ts i
ntern
al
stat
e.
The
ECM
U
pe
rio
dical
ly
send
s
data
to
the
associat
ed
SEC
U
that
send
s
the
m
to
MCC,
SECU_
P
a
nd
SECU
_N.
I
n
this
way
SEC
U
_P
a
nd
S
ECU
_N
c
hec
k
if
S
ECU
is
wor
king
pro
pe
rly
.
T
h
e
E
C
M
U
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
h
a
s
a
n
um
b
e
r
o
f
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
b
i
t
s
t
h
a
t
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
y
i
t
s
i
nt
e
r
n
a
l
s
t
a
t
u
s
;
a
n
e
x
a
m
p
l
e
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
t
o
o
u
r
s
y
s
t
e
m
i
s
s
h
o
w
n
i
n
T
a
b
l
e
1
.
Table
1.
ECM
U
sta
tus
b
it
s
b
it
Flag
b
it
Flag
b
it
Flag
0
Pre
-
Ru
n
m
o
d
e
12
2
8
VDC Left
Hand
f
ailu
re
24
Ph
ase er
ror
1 > thr
esh
o
ld
1
Activ
e
m
o
d
e
13
Moto
r
te
m
p
e
rature
1 err
o
r
25
Ph
ase er
ror
2 >
th
r
esh
o
ld
2
Fail
-
Saf
e
m
o
d
e
14
Moto
r
te
m
p
e
rature
2 err
o
r
26
End
of
tr
av
el
-
Fail
Retracte
d
3
An
ti
-
Ja
m
m
i
n
g
m
o
d
e
15
ECMU
te
m
p
e
ratur
e er
ro
r
27
End
of
tr
av
el
-
Fail
E
x
ten
d
ed
4
Mainten
an
ce
m
o
d
e
16
Res
o
lv
er
1
f
ailu
re
28
AJS Moto
r
ch
e
ck
5
3
0
0
VDC
m
o
to
r
check
17
Res
o
lv
er
2
f
ailu
re
29
RAM A
ccess
6
Max cu
rr
en
t
18
Res
o
lv
er
1
inp
u
t <
th
resh
o
ld
30
Fir
m
w
are
check
su
m
e
rr
o
r
7
Max cu
rr
en
t varian
ce
19
Res
o
lv
er
1
inp
u
t >
th
resh
o
ld
31
No
n
-
v
o
latile
m
e
m
o
ry
ac
cess
8
3
0
0
VDC Rig
h
t Hand
f
ailu
re
20
Res
o
lv
er
1
a
m
p
litu
d
e
m
is
m
atch
32
Res
o
lv
er
to
dig
ital acce
ss
1
9
3
0
0
VDC Left
Hand
f
ailu
re
21
Res
o
lv
er
2
inp
u
t <
th
resh
o
ld
33
Res
o
lv
er
to
dig
ital acce
ss
2
10
3
0
0
VDC Vo
ltag
e li
m
it
22
Res
o
lv
er
2
inp
u
t >
th
resh
o
ld
…
Sp
are
11
2
8
VDC Rig
h
t Hand
f
ailu
re
23
Res
o
lv
er
2
a
m
p
litu
d
e
m
is
m
atch
47
Sp
are
3.
THE
PROPO
SED TEST
P
L
ATFO
RM
3.1
.
The har
dware
a
rchi
tectu
re
of t
he
pr
opose
d t
es
t
pl
atf
or
m
The
c
om
plexity
of
ECM
U,
both
in
the
el
ect
ro
nics
a
nd
s
of
t
war
e,
m
akes
c
om
pr
eh
ensive
te
sts
necessa
ry
in
al
l
dev
el
opm
ent
ph
ases
,
in
or
der
to
ea
rly
detect
and
corre
ct
err
ors.
T
his
is
wh
y
each
ECM
U
unde
rgoes
i
n
-
de
pth
te
sti
ng,
fol
lowed
by
inte
gr
at
io
n
te
sts
a
nd
sta
nda
rd
te
st
s
that
are
run
on
f
ully
equ
i
ppe
d
te
st
sta
nd
s
.
Test
in
g
ECM
U
f
unct
ion
al
it
y
inclu
de
s
stim
ulatin
g
it
via
hardw
a
re
an
d
software
inte
rf
a
ces
a
nd
evalu
at
in
g
it
s
r
esp
on
ses
.
Func
ti
on
al
te
sti
ng
of
ECM
U
s,
besi
des
te
sti
ng
for
basic
f
unct
io
na
li
ty
,
m
us
t
al
so
te
s
t
the
m
os
t
sign
ific
ant
fa
ults
at
the
ECM
U
’s
com
m
un
ic
at
ion
a
nd
I/O
i
nterf
aces
.
T
hese
consi
der
at
io
ns
plac
e
stric
t
req
uir
e
m
ents
on
r
obus
t,
hi
gh
-
capa
ci
ty
te
st
syste
m
s
in
te
r
m
s
of
inter
faces
and
te
st
hardw
a
re,
te
st
autom
a
ti
on
,
operati
on
of
so
ft
war
e
int
erf
aces
.
Be
sid
es,
the
pro
po
s
ed
te
st
syst
e
m
req
uires
int
ensive
cal
culat
ion
s,
a
nd preci
se sy
nc
hro
nizat
ion
s
.
To
sat
isfy
the
s
e
requirem
ents,
we
im
ple
m
ented
it
us
in
g
a
NI
C
om
pact
RIO
(cRI
O)
syst
e
m
.
This
is
an
ad
va
nced
e
m
bed
ded
c
on
t
ro
l
an
d
data
acqu
isi
ti
on
syst
e
m
,
desig
ned
for
ap
plica
ti
ons
that
require
hi
gh
perform
ance
and
reli
abili
ty
,
as
well
as
flexibili
ty
and
scalab
il
it
y.
A
cR
IO
syst
e
m
esse
ntial
ly
con
sist
s
of
f
ou
r
m
ai
n
com
po
ne
nts:
an
em
bed
de
d
re
al
-
ti
m
e
con
tr
oller,
a
high
-
perform
ance
FPGA,
I/
O
m
od
ul
es,
and
the
app
li
cat
io
n
pro
gr
am
.
Each
I/O
m
odule
is
directl
y
con
necte
d
to
the
FP
GA,
prov
i
ding
lo
w
-
le
vel
custom
iz
at
ion
of
ti
m
ing
and
I/O
sig
nal
pr
ocessin
g.
T
he
FPGA
is
co
n
nected
to
t
he
e
m
bed
de
d
real
-
tim
e
process
or
via
a
high
-
s
pee
d
P
CI
bus.
T
his
pl
at
fo
rm
m
akes
po
ssi
ble
to
ad
op
t
m
ulti
cor
e
processi
ng
a
nd
high
-
perform
ance
F
PGAs,
i
n
ord
er
to
im
pr
ove
the
te
st
syst
e
m
per
f
orm
ance.
T
he
propo
sed
te
st
syst
e
m
ha
s
a
m
od
ula
r
arc
hitec
tur
e,
base
d
on
a
MC
C
and
s
om
e
SECUs.
I
n
this
r
esearch
phase
we
im
ple
m
ented
tw
o
SECU
unit
s (
S
ECU1 an
d
SE
CU2) eac
h of
wh
ic
h
incl
udes
as s
how
n
in
Fi
gure
5:
a)
On
e
CR
IO
-
9039,
Em
b
e
dde
d
cri
o
c
on
t
rol
le
r
with
real
-
tim
e
pr
oce
ss
or
a
nd
reconf
igurable
FP
G
A
(1.91
ghz
, q
ua
d
-
c
or
e
, 8
-
SLOT,
325T FP
GA);
b)
On
e
N
I
P
S
-
15
powe
r
s
upply,
24 VDC,
5 A;
c)
Tw
o
N
I
9860
m
od
ules:
2
-
po
rt
ha
rdwa
re
-
se
le
ct
able
NI
-
X
NET
C
A
N/LI
N
(
l
ocal
inte
rc
onnect
netw
ork
)
com
pactdaq
a
nd
cri
o
inter
fa
ce
for
de
velo
pi
ng
C
AN
an
d/
or
LI
N
a
pp
li
c
at
ion
s,
f
or
t
he
co
nn
ect
io
n
t
o
SECU
_P
a
nd S
ECU_N;
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
In
t J
Elec
&
C
om
p
En
g
IS
S
N: 20
88
-
8708
Test pl
atform f
or
elec
tro
nic c
on
tr
ol
un
it
s
of
high
-
perfo
rm
ance s
afety
…
(
Giov
anni B
ucc
i
)
4059
d)
On
e
N
I
98
53
2
-
port
hi
gh
-
s
pe
ed
CA
N
m
odule
(this
m
odul
e,
no
t
us
e
d
f
or
the
re
fe
ren
ce
d
ap
plica
ti
on,
will
b
e
us
e
d
f
or int
er
facin
g h
ydra
ulic ac
tuators
);
e)
On
e
N
I 987
1 m
od
ule: 4 s
e
ri
al
p
ort
RS
-
422/RS
-
485 ac
cess
ed direct
ly
f
r
om
the FP
GA
;
f)
Tw
o
NI
9401
m
od
ules: 5 V/
TTL,
8
c
ha
nn
e
ls, b
i
directi
ona
l digita
l I/O
.
A
H
os
t
PC
is
connecte
d
to
e
ach
SEC
U,
i
n
order
t
o
s
how
s
the
te
st
res
ults.
As
s
how
n
i
n
Fig
ure
5
t
he
MC
C has
bee
n
im
ple
m
ent
ed usin
g
:
a)
A
Pe
rs
on
al
C
om
pu
te
r
with
W
indows i
ns
ta
ll
ed;
b)
A Ko
m
odo
CA
N Duo
In
te
rf
ac
e li
nk
e
d
to
a
P
C USB
2.0 p
ort
, for
t
he
c
onne
ct
ion
to
SEC
U
1
a
nd SEC
U2
;
c)
A
la
bvie
w
appl
ic
at
ion
pr
ogra
m
.
Figure
5. A
rch
i
te
ct
ur
e
of
t
he
i
m
ple
m
ented
te
st plat
form
The
MC
C
wr
i
te
s
the
sam
e
m
essage
to
both
K
OMO
D
O
C
AN
outp
ut
ports
at
t
he
sam
e
tim
e,
and
receives
m
essages
f
r
om
bo
th
SEC
U
1
an
d
SECU
2
on
t
he
tw
o
ports.
Using
the
MC
C
app
li
cat
ion
pro
gr
am
the ope
rator ca
n:
a)
Config
ur
e
the i
nterf
ace
used
to
c
omm
un
ic
at
e
w
it
h
t
he
sec
us;
b)
Creat
e
the
set
-
posit
ion
pro
file
as
sh
ow
n
in
Fig
ur
e
6,
t
he
sam
ples
are
sent
to
the
two
sec
us
as
a set
-
posit
io
n
f
ram
e;
c)
Start an
d
st
op the
prof
il
e
fr
am
es tran
sm
issi
on
(
in
our ap
plica
ti
on
the
fram
e i
s sen
t e
ve
ry 20
m
s);
d)
Send
com
m
and
s
to
t
he
sec
us
to
co
ntr
ol
the
ec
m
us
,
by
m
eans
of
t
he
E
NAB
LE
dig
it
al
sign
al
as
sho
wn
in
Figure
4
;
e)
Ena
ble/D
isa
ble
the
An
ti
-
Jam
m
ing
, by m
eans of
the
A
J
E
dig
it
al
sign
al
;
f)
Send c
omm
and
s t
o
the
secu
s
to p
e
rfo
rm
s a p
os
it
ion co
ntr
ol
towa
rd
s
the
ho
m
e p
os
it
io
n;
g)
Save
data
to/
from
secus;
t
he
MC
C
sav
es
a
NI
TD
MS
(tech
nical
data
m
anag
em
ent
stream
ing)
file
that co
ntains all
data se
nt/recei
ved to/f
rom
the secus
.
Wh
e
n
the
MC
C
send
s
a
c
om
m
and
or
requires
a
c
hange
on
a
C
onfig
urat
ion
Re
gister
,
the
SEC
Us
ackno
wled
ge
t
he
m
essage
s
end
i
ng
an
AC
K
m
essage.
T
he
MC
C
dis
pl
ay
s
inf
or
m
at
ion
a
bout
the
ACKs
receive
d
from
the
SECU
on
the
Ma
in
L
og
window.
T
he
MC
C
receiv
es
an
AC
K
only
if
the
tra
nsm
it
te
d
com
m
and
has
been
c
orrectl
y
receive
d
an
d
va
li
dated.
If
no
ACK
is
receiv
ed
after
a
tim
e
ou
t
(
150
m
s
in
ou
r
case),
the
Ma
in
Lo
g
wind
ow
disp
la
ys
a
warnin
g
an
d
re
qu
e
sts
to
resend
th
e
m
essage.
If
the
m
ess
age
is
sent
to
bo
t
h
the
SEC
Us
(Br
oa
dcast)
the
MC
C
wil
l
wait
fo
r
two
ACKs
(
from
S
ECU1
a
nd
SE
CU2),
if
at
le
a
st
on
e
is
no
t
receive
d
it
disp
la
ys a
n
e
rror any
way.
R
S
4
8
5
E
T
H
E
R
N
E
T
C
A
N
M
CC
S
E
C
U
1
1
6
9
.
2
5
4
.
1
4
1
.
4
7
1
6
9
.
2
5
4
.
1
4
1
.
4
5
S
E
C
U
1
T
E
ST
P
LA
T
F
OR
M
E
x
S
y
s
R
S
4
8
5
U
S
B
-
6
0
0
8
E
C
M
U
1
S
E
C
U
-
1
C
A
N
-
B
S
E
C
U
-
1
C
A
N
-
A
S
E
C
U
-
2
C
A
N
-
A
S
E
C
U
-
2
C
A
N
-
B
1
6
9
.
2
5
4
.
1
4
1
.
4
6
S
E
C
U
2
E
T
H
E
R
N
E
T
S
E
C
U
2
1
6
9
.
2
5
4
.
1
4
1
.
4
5
U
S
B
M
C
C
SY
ST
E
M UN
D
E
R
T
E
ST
R
S
4
8
5
E
x
S
y
s
R
S
4
8
5
U
S
B
-
6
0
0
8
E
C
M
U
2
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
IS
S
N
:
2088
-
8708
In
t J
Elec
&
C
om
p
En
g,
V
ol.
10
, No
.
4
,
A
ugus
t
2020
:
4053
-
4072
4060
Figure
6.
Pa
ge fo
r
the
pr
of
il
e
gen
e
rati
on
3.2.
The i
mple
men
ted
c
omm
unic
at
i
on
s
ystem
of the
pr
oposed
t
es
t
pl
atfo
rm
The
com
m
un
ic
at
ion
sta
ndar
d
ad
opte
d
f
or
the
MC
C
-
to
-
S
ECU
a
nd
SECU
-
to
-
SE
CU
li
nk
s
i
s
the
c
on
tr
oller
a
rea
netw
ork
(C
AN)
se
rial
sta
ndar
d.
D
ue
t
o
t
he
sta
ndar
dizat
ion
of
pa
rt
of
t
he
physi
cal
an
d
data
li
nk
la
ye
rs
of
the
O
SI
re
fer
e
nce
m
od
el
in
IS
O
11898
[
20]
an
d
t
he
ope
nn
e
ss
of
the
prot
oco
l,
CA
N
al
lows
dev
ic
es
,
se
nso
rs
a
nd
act
uato
rs
f
r
om
diff
er
ent
m
anu
factu
rer
s
t
o
c
omm
un
ic
at
e.
O
rigi
nally
dev
el
ope
d
f
or
autom
otive
ap
plica
ti
on
s,
it
at
tract
ed
the
at
te
ntion
of
m
anu
f
act
ur
er
s
in
ot
he
r
industries
th
a
t
adopt
autom
at
ion
and
e
nha
nced
s
ens
or
s/a
ct
uat
ors
[
21
]
.
The
re
m
ai
nin
g
ph
ysi
cal
la
ye
r
an
d
al
l
of
the h
ig
he
r
la
ye
rs
are not d
efi
ned
by CA
N
s
pecif
ic
at
ion
.
CAN
s
uppo
rts
distrib
uted
real
-
tim
e
con
tr
ol
with
a
high
le
ve
l
of
sec
ur
it
y.
The
data
sig
na
l
is
norm
ally
t
ran
sm
itted
on
a
twist
ed
pair
of
wires,
with
a
m
axi
m
um
bit
rate
of
1
Mbit
/s
(cab
l
e
le
ng
ths
<
40
m
).
Data
colli
sions
on
t
he
bus
a
re
avo
i
ded
us
i
ng
bo
t
h
the
ca
rr
i
er
sen
se
m
ultip
le
acce
ss
an
d
arb
it
rati
on
ba
sed
on
m
essage
pr
i
or
i
ty
te
chn
ologie
s
.
The
num
ber
of
te
rm
inals
connecte
d
t
o
the
bus
is
nor
m
al
l
y
lim
i
te
d
to
32,
to avoid
d
at
a
tr
ansm
issi
on
d
el
ay
.
Com
m
ercial
air
cra
ft
ha
ve
al
r
eady
ad
op
te
d
the
CA
N
bus
[22].
I
n
order
to
ens
ur
e
i
nter
op
e
ra
bili
ty
betwee
n
CA
N
subsyst
em
s,
the
Net
work
Infr
ast
ru
ct
ur
e
and
Sec
ur
it
y
gro
up
of
the
ai
rlines
el
ect
roni
c
eng
i
neer
i
ng
c
om
m
i
tt
ee
(A
EEC)
has
def
i
ned
the
ARI
NC
825
a
viati
on
pr
oto
c
ol
sta
ndar
d
that
sp
e
ci
fies
bot
h
the
c
omm
un
icati
on
within
C
AN
-
ba
sed
s
ub
-
syst
e
m
s,
and
be
tween
CA
N
s
ub
-
syst
em
s
[2
3]
.
ARI
NC82
5
will
be
the CA
N
sta
ndard f
or all
f
ut
ure Air
bus a
nd B
oein
g
ai
rc
raf
ts
.
Wh
e
n
the
MC
C
send
s
a
f
ra
m
e
to
the
SECU,
each
S
ECU
is
identifie
d
in
the
CAN
netw
ork
wit
h
a
un
i
qu
e
“B
as
e
ID
e
ntifie
r”
(
ID).
CA
N
s
upports
tw
o
tran
sferred
m
essage
(
fr
am
e)
fo
r
m
at
s,
as
def
in
ed
i
n
the
“B
os
c
h
versi
on
2.0
s
pecif
i
cat
ion
s”
[
20]
;
the
esse
ntial
diff
e
ren
ce
bet
we
en
them
is
the
le
ng
th
of
th
e
I
D:
11
bits
in
the
sta
nd
a
r
d
fr
am
e
fo
rm
at
(2
.0A),
and
29
bits
in
the
exten
de
d
fr
am
e
fo
rm
at
(2
.
0B).
I
n
ou
r
case
the d
e
fa
ult val
ues
a
re:
a)
Me
ssages
from
MC
C t
o
SEC
U1
:
0x01;
b)
Me
ssages
from
MC
C t
o
SEC
U2
:
0x02;
c)
Me
ssages
from
SECU
1
t
o
MC
C:
0
x1
0;
d)
Me
ssages
from
SECU
2
t
o
MC
C:
0
x2
0;
e)
Broa
dcast
m
es
sages:
0xff
.
The
a
dopte
d protoc
ol f
ie
ld
s,
s
how
n
in
Fig
ure
7
,
are:
Figure
7.
The
a
dopted
CA
N
m
essage
f
or
m
at
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
In
t J
Elec
&
C
om
p
En
g
IS
S
N: 20
88
-
8708
Test pl
atform f
or
elec
tro
nic c
on
tr
ol
un
it
s
of
high
-
perfo
rm
ance s
afety
…
(
Giov
anni B
ucc
i
)
4061
a)
ST
X
(
0x02)
is
a
co
ntr
ol
cha
ra
ct
er th
at
in
dica
te
s the start
of
a n
e
w fram
e.
b)
ID
:
fr
am
e
iden
ti
ficat
ion
:
-
‘M’ (0
x4D
): fr
a
m
e w
it
h
m
eas
ur
em
ents f
r
om
SECU
t
o
MC
C
;
-
‘S
’
(0x5
3)
:
pos
it
ion
set
po
i
nt fro
m
MC
C t
o
S
ECU;
-
‘O’ (0
x4F)
:
fr
a
m
e received
correctl
y from
SECU
to
MC
C (
m
essage w
it
ho
ut
payl
oa
d);
-
‘E’ (
0x45):
fr
a
m
e received
w
i
th erro
r fr
om
SECU
to
MC
C (
m
essage w
it
ho
ut p
ay
loa
d);
-
‘J’
(
0x4A):
fr
a
m
e to en
a
ble/d
isa
ble the
AJ;
-
‘G’ (0
x47):
fra
m
e to start the
Ho
m
ing
proce
dure;
-
‘R’ (0x
52): fra
m
e to notify
th
e en
d of
H
om
i
ng
pr
ocedur
e
(fr
om
SECU
to
M
CC
);
-
‘K’ (0
x4
B
): fra
m
e to m
ask
the A
J i
nter
nal r
e
gister;
-
‘P
’
(0x5
0)
:
fr
a
m
e to m
ask
the d
am
pin
g
i
nter
nal r
e
gister;
-
‘A’ (0
x41):
fra
m
e to upd
at
e
the
global en
abl
e anti
-
j
am
m
ing
r
e
gister;
-
‘U’ (0
x55):
fra
m
e to upd
at
e
the
global en
abl
e d
am
pin
g re
gister.
c)
Paylo
ad
i
s
the
us
e
fu
l
i
nfor
m
at
ion
plu
s
t
he
ESC
(
0x1B)
c
har
act
er
.
Eac
h
byte
of
in
f
orm
at
ion
eq
ual
to
STX
,
ET
X or
ESC is
pr
ece
de
d by an
ESC c
har
act
er
.
d)
Checksu
m
is
a
byte
co
ntainin
g
the
resu
lt
of
the
excl
us
ive
OR
lo
gical
operati
on
(CRC
)
of
both
I
D
a
nd
payl
oad,
exec
ute
d
by
the
tr
ansm
itter.
The
receiver
re
pe
at
s
the
cal
cula
ti
on
to
chec
k
if
the
fr
am
e
i
s
correct
.
e)
ETX
(0x
03)
is t
he
c
on
t
ro
l c
ha
r
act
er th
at
in
dic
at
es the e
nd of
the fram
e.
An
ac
knowle
dg
m
ent
te
chn
iqu
e
has
bee
n
i
m
ple
m
ented
fo
r
a
ll
the
fr
am
e,
in
or
de
r
to
chec
k
the
recei
ved
da
ta
.
O
nly
f
or
both
t
he
m
easurem
ent
an
d
set
po
i
nt
f
ram
es
no
flo
w
c
on
t
ro
l
is
ap
plied:
if
a
fr
am
e
is
lost,
it
is
no
t
rec
ov
e
red.
T
he
m
a
in
reas
on
for
this
ch
oice
is
that
ther
e
is
no
t
e
noug
h
ti
m
e
am
on
g
the
f
r
a
m
es
to r
e
peat them
. In
case
of a
prob
le
m
, th
e rece
iver wai
ts f
or the
nex
t
fr
am
e w
it
h new data.
The
com
m
un
ic
at
ion
betwee
n
SECUs
is
base
d
on
the
CAN
bus.
T
he
SECU1
is
identifie
d
by
ID
=
0x
12,
S
E
CU
by
0x21.
A
CR
C
fiel
d
is
us
e
d
to
c
he
ck
the
fr
am
e
and
to
request
the
retra
ns
m
i
ssion.
The
payl
oa
d
f
r
a
m
e
is
co
m
po
sed
of
two
s
ub
-
f
ram
es.
T
h
e
f
i
r
s
t
3
0
b
y
t
e
s
a
r
e
t
h
e
l
a
s
t
E
C
M
U
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
f
r
a
m
e
a
s
s
h
o
w
n
i
n
T
a
b
l
e
2
.
T
h
e
E
C
M
U
t
r
a
n
s
m
i
t
s
d
a
t
a
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
f
r
o
m
r
e
d
u
n
d
a
n
t
t
r
a
n
s
d
u
c
e
r
s
t
h
a
t
a
r
e
c
h
e
c
k
e
d
(
v
a
l
i
d
a
t
e
d
)
b
y
t
h
e
S
E
C
U
t
o
s
e
e
i
f
t
h
e
y
a
r
e
i
n
t
h
e
r
a
n
g
e
.
V
a
l
u
e
s
o
u
t
o
f
t
h
e
r
a
n
g
e
a
r
e
n
o
t
s
e
n
t
t
o
t
h
e
o
t
h
e
r
S
E
C
U
s
.
I
n
t
h
i
s
c
a
s
e
t
h
e
v
a
l
i
d
d
a
t
a
a
r
e
t
h
o
s
e
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
t
o
t
h
e
l
a
s
t
v
a
l
i
d
a
t
e
d
f
r
a
m
e
.
T
h
e
l
a
s
t
4
b
y
t
e
s
,
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
t
o
t
h
e
S
E
C
U
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
s
t
a
t
u
s
b
i
t
s
,
a
r
e
s
h
a
r
e
d
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
o
t
h
e
r
S
E
C
U
s
.
T
he
S
ECU
sta
tus
bits as s
hown in T
able
3.
Table
2.
T
he
m
easur
em
ent f
r
a
m
e
Da
ta
Dime
n
si
o
n
(b
y
tes)
ID
1
v
a
li
d
a
ted L
VD
T
measu
rem
e
n
t
4
v
a
li
d
a
ted E
C
MU
D
C
B
u
s cur
ren
t
4
v
a
li
d
a
ted E
C
MU
D
C
B
u
s v
o
lt
a
g
e
4
v
a
li
d
a
ted E
C
MU
te
m
p
e
ratu
re
4
v
a
li
d
a
ted E
C
MU
PCB
te
m
p
e
r
a
tu
re
2
v
a
li
d
a
ted E
C
MU
T
o
rq
u
e
4
E
C
MU
S
tatu
s b
it
s 0
-
7
1
E
C
MU
St
a
tu
s b
it
s 8
-
15
1
E
C
MU
St
a
tu
s b
it
s 1
6
-
23
1
E
C
MU
St
a
tu
s b
it
s 2
4
-
31
1
E
C
MU
St
a
tu
s b
it
s 3
2
-
39
1
E
C
MU
St
a
tu
s b
it
s 4
0
-
47
1
CRC
1
S
E
C
U
S
tatu
s b
it
s 0
-
7
1
S
E
C
U
S
tatu
s b
it
s 8
-
15
1
S
E
C
U
S
tatu
s b
it
s 1
6
-
23
1
S
E
C
U
S
tatu
s b
it
s 2
4
-
31
1
Table
3.
T
he
S
ECU stat
us bit
s
b
it
b
it
0
E
C
MU
c
a
b
le
e
rr
o
r
11
MC
C
C
a
b
le
e
rr
o
r
1
E
C
MU
valid
a
ti
o
n
e
rr
o
r
12
MC
C
A
J r
e
q
u
e
st
2
S
E
C
U_N c
a
b
le
e
rr
o
r
13
E
C
MU
tra
c
k
in
g
e
rror
3
S
E
C
U_P
c
a
b
le
e
rr
o
r
14
DA
MP
fo
r EC
MU
F
a
il
-
S
a
fe
4
F
o
rce
Fi
g
h
ti
n
g
15
DA
MP
fo
r EC
MU
AJ
5
E
C
MU
R
e
a
d
y
16
Dam
p
fo
r AJ
6
E
n
a
b
le
st
a
te
17
De
fo
rce
fig
h
ti
n
g
7
AJ st
a
te
18
S
p
a
re
8
E
C
MU
ru
n
..
…
9
Dam
p
in
g
state
..
…
10
AJ requ
e
st
31
S
p
a
re
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
IS
S
N
:
2088
-
8708
In
t J
Elec
&
C
om
p
En
g,
V
ol.
10
, No
.
4
,
A
ugus
t
2020
:
4053
-
4072
4062
The
c
omm
un
icati
on
be
twee
n
SECU
a
nd
ECM
U
is
base
d
on
tw
o
RS
-
485
diff
e
re
ntial
com
m
un
ic
at
ion
li
nk
that
is
the
m
os
t
com
mo
nly
us
e
d
in
c
omm
ercial
actu
at
ors.
On
e
li
nk
is
use
d
t
o
transm
it
the
po
sit
i
on
set
-
point
to
EC
MU
an
d
the
ot
her
to
r
ecei
ve
the
ECM
U
m
ea
su
rem
ent
fr
am
e.
In
our
case
the
bit
rate
was
set
at
115.2 k
bit/
s,
th
e fr
am
e p
eri
od
at
2
0 m
s
.
The
m
ai
n
SECU
i
ntern
al
reg
ist
e
rs are:
a)
Global
D
am
p R
eg: u
se
d
t
o
c
onfig
ur
e
the
D
a
m
pin
g
M
ode
beh
a
viou
r of
t
he
SECU;
b)
Global
AJ Re
g:
u
se
d
to
confi
gure t
he An
ti
-
J
a
m
m
ing
M
od
e
beh
a
viou
r of
t
he
SECU;
c)
Ma
sk
Dam
p
Re
g:
use
d t
o
set
the D
am
pin
g
Mod
e
b
e
ha
viour
b
ase
d o
n
the
ECM
U
Stat
us
bits;
d)
Ma
sk
AJ
Re
g:
us
e
d
to
set the
An
ti
-
Jam
m
ing
Mod
e
b
e
ha
viour
b
ase
d o
n
the
ECM
U
Stat
us
bits.
The
im
ple
m
ented
te
st
syst
e
m
is
m
od
ular
and
le
ts
us
er
s
set
up
flexi
ble
te
st
syst
e
m
s
with
li
t
tl
e
in
te
gr
at
io
n
or
wirin
g
e
ffor
t.
I
t
dr
i
ves
ECM
U
in
puts
a
nd
ou
t
pu
ts
f
or
f
unct
ion
al
te
sti
ng
with
t
he
CA
N
li
nks
.
It
le
ts
us
e
rs
s
et
up
c
om
pact
te
st
be
nc
hes
of
va
rio
us
c
om
plexiti
es.
Due
to
it
s
m
odular
c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n,
it
i
s
su
it
able
f
or
s
m
al
l
te
st
set
u
ps
at
dev
el
oper
w
orkb
e
nc
he
s
as
well
as
fo
r
c
om
pr
ehe
ns
ive
te
st
be
nc
hes
in
the test
ing l
ab
orat
or
y.
3.3
.
The so
ft
w
are
architec
tu
re
of the pr
oposed
t
es
t
pl
atfo
rm
The
te
st
a
ppli
cat
ion
pro
gr
a
m
has
bee
n
de
velo
ped
in
th
e
N
I
La
bVIE
W
e
nviro
nm
ent.
This
wi
dely
app
li
ed
t
oo
l
he
lps
t
o
re
du
ce
the
so
ft
war
e
dev
el
op
m
ent
tim
e
and
to
en
han
ce
t
he
pro
cessi
ng
perf
orm
ance.
Ma
ny
high
-
e
nd
com
pu
te
rs
to
day
offer
tw
o
or
m
or
e
proces
so
r
c
or
es
f
or
add
it
io
nal
com
pu
ta
ti
on
po
wer.
A
key
appr
oach
f
or
ta
king
ad
van
ta
ge
of
m
ult
ic
or
e
proces
sors
is
the
m
ultithr
e
ade
d
pro
gr
am
m
in
g.
I
n
a
m
ulti
thread
ed
app
li
cat
io
n
sever
al
threa
ds
can
si
m
ultaneou
sly
r
un
on
diff
e
re
nt
proc
essors.
Mult
it
hr
ea
ding
is
sim
il
ar
t
o
m
ul
ti
pr
ocessi
ng,
t
he
m
ai
n
dif
fer
e
nce
is
t
hat
a
threa
d
has
a
reduce
d
c
om
pl
exity
an
d
is
use
d
for
a
sm
al
l
ta
sk
.
Thr
ea
ds
are
se
qu
e
ntial
proces
ses
that
sh
are
m
e
m
or
y.
They
can
m
anag
e
I/
O
m
or
e
eff
ic
ie
ntly
becau
se
a
threa
d
wait
s for I/O
whil
e o
the
rs
a
re
processi
ng the
acqu
i
red sig
nal
s.
This
te
ch
nolo
gy
is
not
easi
ly
app
li
cable:
pro
blem
s
co
m
es
wh
e
n
t
ryi
ng
to
w
rite
a
softwa
re
th
at
us
e
s
these
process
or
c
or
es
ef
fecti
ve
ly
[24].
Sin
gl
e
-
threa
de
d
a
pp
li
cat
ion
s
can
r
un
on
only
a
s
ing
le
process
or,
t
hu
s
pr
e
ve
nting
the
m
fr
om
ta
kin
g
a
dv
a
ntage
of
the
m
ulti
ple
process
ors
to
i
m
pr
ove
perf
or
m
ance.
T
herefo
re
,
to
achieve
m
a
xim
u
m
per
fo
r
m
ance
from
m
ulti
thread
e
d
operati
ng
syst
em
s
and
/or
m
ulti
pr
oces
sor
m
a
chine
s
,
an
ap
plica
ti
on
m
us
t
be
m
ulti
t
hr
ea
de
d.
O
ne
te
chn
i
qu
e
is
to
par
ti
ti
on
the
a
pp
li
cat
io
n
into
m
ulti
ple
threa
ds
that
are
sch
ed
uled
acro
s
s
the
m
ulti
ple
processi
ng
CPU
c
or
es
by
the
operati
ng
syst
e
m
.
T
h
e
L
a
b
V
i
e
w
n
a
t
i
v
e
p
a
r
a
l
l
e
l
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
i
n
g
c
a
p
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
a
u
t
o
m
a
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
r
u
n
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
p
a
r
a
l
l
e
l
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
c
o
d
e
o
n
t
h
e
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
c
o
r
e
s
[
2
5
]
.
The
e
xecu
ti
on
threa
ds
gen
e
rall
y
need
to
c
om
m
un
ic
at
e
with
on
e
an
oth
e
r
as
they
w
ork.
A
so
luti
on
t
o
this
prob
le
m
,
t
ypic
al
of
pa
rall
el
co
m
pu
ta
ti
on
s,
is
that
each
sta
ge
ad
ds
da
ta
to
the
inp
ut
qu
eue
for
th
e
next
sta
ge
w
hen
it
is
done.
T
o
pro
per
ly
w
ork,
the
inp
ut
que
ue
ne
eds
to
be
w
ritt
en
so
that
data
can
safely
be
add
e
d
by
one
threa
d
and
rem
ov
ed
by
ano
the
r
one
without
co
rru
pt
ing
the
data
struct
ur
e.
In
our
app
li
cat
io
n
we
based
the im
ple
m
ented
th
read com
m
un
ic
at
ion
on t
he
pro
ducer
-
c
on
s
um
er
par
a
di
gm
that
m
ana
ges data
m
essa
ge
f
r
om
diff
e
re
nt
threa
ds
.
I
n
this
wa
y,
the
data
ar
e
protect
ed
by
m
ulti
ple
acce
sses
an
d
e
ve
ry
threa
d
has
bee
n
dev
el
op
e
d
us
i
ng
a
blo
c
k
syst
em
:
the
thread
is
blo
cke
d
du
ring
the
pr
ocessi
ng
of
data.
I
f
ano
t
her
m
essage
has
been
se
nt
to
the
th
read,
it
is
s
tore
d
i
n
a
FI
F
O
buf
fer
so
it
can
be
proces
sed
w
hen
the
t
hr
ea
d
e
nd
s
the pr
ocessin
g of t
he pre
vious
d
at
a.
3.3.1
.
T
he m
ain appli
ca
tion
progra
m thre
ad
s
of the pr
oposed
t
es
t pl
atfo
rm
The
MCC
thre
ad
is
the
t
hr
ea
d
-
base
d
SEC
U
firm
war
e
that
m
anag
es
the
i
nteracti
on
with
the
MC
C.
Secu
rity
in
data
transm
issi
on
is
of
utm
os
t
i
m
po
rtance.
As
the
SEC
U
–
M
CC
li
nk
is
co
nc
ern
e
d,
t
he
sec
ur
it
y
is
base
d
on
the
channel
re
dundancy,
s
o
co
m
m
and
s
or
da
ta
are
validat
ed
if
they
are
identic
al
on
t
he
tw
o
channels.
As
t
he
SEC
U
-
EC
MU
li
nk
i
s
co
ncerne
d,
the
S
ECU
chec
k
th
at
they
are
in
the
per
m
issi
ble
range
.
As
s
how
n
i
n
Fi
gure
8, this th
r
ead is s
ubdi
vide
d
int
o
m
or
e s
ub
t
hr
ea
ds
.
At
first
the
SE
CU
threa
d
ope
ns
two
bi
-
dire
ct
ion
al
CAN
c
onnecti
ons
to
wards
the
MC
C,
then
three
threa
ds
are use
d
to
receive a
nd se
nd
data f
rom
/t
o
the MC
C
s: on
e t
hr
ea
d
si
m
ul
ta
neo
usl
y sends data to C
AN_
A
and
CA
N_
B
i
nt
erf
aces,
w
hile
two
t
hr
ea
ds
a
r
e
us
e
d
to
recei
ve
data
f
ro
m
MC
C
(one
f
or
CAN
_A
an
d
one
f
or
CAN
_B).
Un
l
ike
transm
issio
n,
two
th
rea
ds
are
f
or
th
e
two
data
re
cepti
on
beca
use
they
can
be
not
si
m
ultaneou
s
.
The
t
wo
recei
ve
d
data
pa
cket
s
(
on
e
f
or
eve
r
y
CAN
c
ha
nne
l)
are
t
hen
se
nt
to
tw
o
t
hr
ea
ds
that
pu
t
t
he
m
essages
in
tw
o
buff
e
red
ci
rcu
la
r
F
I
FO
s.
Th
ese
th
r
eads
ide
ntify
t
he
beg
i
nn
i
ng
a
nd
en
d
of
e
ve
r
y
MCC
m
essage.
A
fter
t
he
identific
at
ion
,
t
he
V
alidat
ion
D
ata
Th
r
e
ad
c
om
par
es
the
tw
o
data
pa
ckets
to
ver
ify
they
are the
sam
e.
Af
te
r
this
valid
at
ion
t
he
m
essage
is
proce
sse
d
by
SEC
U
fir
m
war
e.
If
the
two
CA
N
i
nterfac
es
sup
ply
two
di
ff
e
ren
t
m
essages,
thes
e
are
discha
rged.
T
he
MC
C
Ma
nager
T
hr
e
ad
e
xam
ines
t
he
CA
N
m
ess
age
an
d
sen
ds
the
r
ecei
ved d
at
a t
o
t
he firm
war
e sect
ion co
nce
rn
e
d.
Othe
r
s
ub th
re
ads
a
re:
a)
Check
ca
ble
thread
:
w
he
n
it
detect
s
that
the
m
essages
wer
e
fr
om
a
sing
le
CAN
inter
face,
it
gen
erates
a
n
error m
essage that is
h
an
dled
by the
SECU;
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.