Indonesian J
ournal of Ele
c
trical Engin
eering and
Computer Sci
e
nce
Vol. 5, No. 1,
Jan
uary 20
17
, pp. 181 ~ 1
8
6
DOI: 10.115
9
1
/ijeecs.v5.i1.pp 181
-18
6
181
Re
cei
v
ed
Jul
y
12, 201
6; Revi
sed O
c
tob
e
r 10, 201
6; Acce
pted No
vem
ber 1, 20
16
Attacks of Denial-of-Service on
Networks Layer of OSI
Model and Maintaining of Security
Azeem Moha
mmed Abdul
1
, S
y
ed Uma
r
*
2
1,2
Department of Electronics
and C
o
mmun
i
c
a
tion En
gi
neer
i
n
g
,
KL Univ
ersi
t
y
, Vadd
es
w
a
r
a
m, India
1
Departme
n
t of Computer Sci
ence En
gi
neer
i
ng, Gand
hij
i
Institute of
Scien
c
e and T
e
chno
log
y
(GIST
)
,
Jagg
a
y
ya
pet, Indi
a
*Corres
p
o
ndi
n
g
author, e-ma
i
l
: umar33
2@g
m
ail.com
A
b
st
r
a
ct
T
he e
m
er
genc
e of w
i
reless s
ensor
netw
o
rks as on
e of
the t
e
chn
o
lo
gy tren
ds in th
e co
mi
n
g
years
,
and s
o
me s
pec
ial tests
of safe
ty. The event
w
ill be t
hous
an
ds of tiny s
ens
ors that ch
ea
p
devic
es, me
mo
ry,
radi
o and
mak
e
, in most cas
e
s, no access to the produc
ti
on
and en
ergy. Some gre
a
t chal
len
ges of sens
o
r
netw
o
rks are different; w
e
focus on sec
u
ri
ty in the fo
rm of w
i
reless sensor netw
o
rks. T
o
some net
w
o
r
k
w
i
reless se
nso
r
netw
o
rk in
or
der to
opti
m
i
z
e use
of th
e
s
ensor, so
that
the n
e
tw
ork ca
n be
as
lon
g
as
possi
ble. B
u
t the
ma
na
ge
me
nt of t
he i
m
po
rtant miss
io
n o
f
the sens
or
n
e
tw
ork, deni
al
of service (
D
o
S
)
attacks agains
t the destructi
on
of the
efficient us
e of
net
work res
ourc
e
s and the vital functions of t
he
netw
o
rk. DoS attacks can be
one of the gr
ea
test threats to
security threats
be consi
der
ed
. In fact, there ar
e
m
a
ny different layers of the OSI-DOS.
Ke
y
w
ords
: dat
a security, DoS
attacks,
netwo
rk layer, TCP/IP
Copy
right
©
2017 In
stitu
t
e o
f
Ad
van
ced
En
g
i
n
eerin
g and
Scien
ce. All
rig
h
t
s reser
ve
d
.
1. Introduc
tion
Wirel
e
ss sen
s
or n
e
two
r
ks con
s
ist of t
housand
s of
small devices called sp
atially
distributed sensor nodes,
or mote
s, sensors, networking and the
ability to follow each of them
,
the environm
ent of the
re
al wo
rl
d,
whe
r
e the
s
e
ra
dio wave
s
cal
c
ulation. WS
N can
be
used
in
many ap
plica
t
ions
su
ch
as the military
pre
s
en
ce
on
the battlefield
se
rvice
s
,
saf
e
ty, health a
nd
environ
menta
l
cri
s
i
s
a
nd v
a
riou
s i
n
terfa
c
e
s
. If t
he wi
rele
ss font
sensor
net
w
o
r
ks,
su
ch as
l
o
w
co
st, low po
wer co
nsumpti
on, and a pa
rt that hav
e become d
a
ily, and attention to the great work
of people i
n
the dra
w
a
r
e
a
. WSN a
r
e
harmful fo
r the co
rrect fu
nctioni
ng, including, e
s
sen
t
ial
environ
menta
l
safety mechani
sms fo
r
all types
of
sensor n
e
two
r
ks. But the
WSN n
ode
o
pen
limited resou
r
ce
s sen
s
ors and
comm
unication
ch
annel
s
with
no m
u
lti-ho
p
wi
rele
ss,
it is
increasingly difficult
security
problem
s i
n
WSN. T
he
network
w
ill
be rel
a
tively easy in danger,
that is, the branche
s of the control and
the
oppone
n
t
can be ea
si
ly obtained full acce
ss to the
node. Th
eref
ore all
cha
n
g
e
s a
nd reset the data n
o
d
e
s a
r
e a
ddre
s
sed, in
cludin
g
the en
crypt
i
on
keys. Tog
e
th
er attacks ov
erloa
d
of req
uest
s
to
the target sy
stem
so t
hat they can re
spo
n
d
to
legitimate traf
fic. Therefore
,
in fact, a system,
or some
other
se
rvice
node
s is l
egiti
mate se
nsors.
In this boo
k, Deni
al of Service is con
s
i
dere
d
mainly
beca
u
se the
i
r proto
c
ol
s e
nergy efficie
n
c
y
target fo
r wi
reless
sen
s
o
r
netwo
rks is uniqu
e.
On
e pu
rpo
s
e
of this b
o
o
k
is to provide
an
overview of DoS WSN on t
he Ope
n
Systems In
terco
n
nectio
n
(OSI) model ba
sed
attacks.
2. Wireless
Sensor Net
w
orks Securi
ty
Goals
WSN is
a dif
f
erent type
o
f
netwo
rk,
su
ch
as
the typ
i
cal
com
pute
r
network that
many
simila
rities
be
tween th
em, but also man
y
features
tha
t
are al
so u
n
i
que
sha
r
e
s
. WSN
se
cu
rity to
prote
c
t the informatio
n and
the means of
attack,
and b
ehavior [1] no
de. It is important to ensure
the s
a
fety of WSN.
2.1. Priv
ac
y
of Da
ta
Confid
entiality is a po
ssibi
lity of the message
i
s
sent
to the pa
ssi
ve attacker o
v
er the
netwo
rk. O
n
l
y
the receive
r
unde
rstand
s the me
ssag
e.
This probl
em is very safe. In this WSN,
you can
solv
e these
conf
identiality re
quire
ment
s. The sensor
doe
s not ne
ed to go to the
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
IJEECS
ISSN:
2502-4
752
Attacks of De
nial-of
-
Servi
c
e on Net
w
orks La
yer of OS
I Model … (A
zeem
Moham
m
ed Abdul)
182
neigh
bors. For example,
the us
e of sensitive
military inject maliciou
s
node
s emi
s
sion,
confid
entiality preve
n
ts a
ccess to info
rm
ation
from
ot
her
nod
es.
Developme
n
t a
nd mai
n
tena
n
c
e
of confide
n
tia
lity is nece
s
sary whe
n
pu
blic in
formati
on and the i
dentity of the distribute
d
main
focal poi
nt, to establi
s
h a secu
re commu
nicatio
n
ch
an
nel se
nsors.
2.2. Integrit
y
of Data
The me
ch
ani
sm
sho
u
ld e
n
su
re th
at e
a
ch
organi
za
tion ea
ch m
e
ssag
e trave
l
s fro
m
sen
der to
re
ci
pient
can
ru
n. The i
n
teg
r
ity of data
i
s
, ev
en if lo
st the
positio
n of th
e confide
n
tiality
of the followin
g
rea
s
on
s:
1. The malici
ous n
ode in t
he syrin
ge pa
ssed on to th
e netwo
rk.
2. An alarm, and the dam
a
ge or cau
s
e u
n
co
ntrolla
ble
wirel
e
ss chan
nel is a
c
tivated.
2.3. Data
Ac
cessing
The g
oal i
s
to
en
sure that t
he
servi
c
e
sh
oul
d
be
available
at any ti
me
WSN, b
u
t it is
a
n
internal
o
r
e
x
ternal
attack,
such
as
Deni
al of
Se
rvice
(DOS).
Anothe
r
ap
proa
ch
h
a
s
been
prop
osed by
re
sea
r
chers in ord
e
r to
achi
eve thi
s
go
al. Although
som
e
mech
ani
sm
s of
comm
uni
cati
on bet
wee
n
t
he no
de
s in
orde
r to
en
sure
a central
acce
ss man
ageme
n
t for
the
su
ccess of e
a
ch
me
ssa
ge
to the re
cipi
ent. The fa
ct that the win
n
e
r of the l
ead
ers of availab
l
e
acce
ss p
o
int or group of t
h
reat
s from t
he entire
se
n
s
or network.
Availab
ility is very importa
nt
that the network i
s
fun
c
tioning.
2.4. Auth
enti
cation o
f
Da
ta
Authenticatio
n en
su
re
s th
at the me
ssa
ge is
an auth
o
rized
u
s
e
r
. WSN attack not
only
the ch
ange i
n
the si
ze of
the pa
cket n
e
twork p
a
cke
t. Both refere
nce
s
verify th
e identity of the
sen
der. For
symmetric or asymmet
r
ic mech
ani
sm
f
o
r the
sendi
n
g
an
d receiving n
ode
s, which
encrypts to calcul
ate the share
d
secret
me
ssag
e aut
hentication code (MA
C
) P
o
we
rs? Vario
u
s
method
s
hav
e be
en
devel
oped
to
use t
he
se
cret
key re
se
arche
r
s, but th
e e
n
e
r
gy se
nsors
a
n
d
desi
gn con
s
traints un
comf
ortable e
n
cry
p
tion tech
niq
ues a
r
e comp
lex.
2.5. Av
oid
i
ng Old Data
The fre
s
h
n
e
s
s of the d
a
ta
mean
s that t
he dat
a
and t
he la
st in o
r
d
e
r to e
n
sure t
hat the
messag
e is
not repe
ated
oppon
ent. In orde
r to ta
ckle the probl
em, at such a time or ag
ainst
Un
sign
ed Propertie
s
n
e
e
d
to be a
dde
d to ea
ch p
a
c
ket in o
r
de
r
to che
c
k the
fresh
n
e
ss
of
the
packa
ge.
3. Attack o
f
DoS in WSN
Deni
al-of
-
Service [DoS] attack events to
redu
ce elimi
nate or p
r
eve
n
t the normal
use of
the Internet. Private Service re
so
urce
DOS a
ttack legitimate users
can be
expecte
d un
der
norm
a
l
cir
c
u
m
st
an
ce
s.
Th
eref
o
r
e,
a
sy
st
em o
r
se
rvice to
the
use
r
. Insid
e
the
DOS pl
ace a
s
a
con
s
e
que
nce
of a hardwa
r
e failure, soft
ware failu
re,
the Austin, environm
ental con
d
ition
s
, or
a
compl
e
x com
b
ination of these fa
ctors EXH. Dos o
u
ter
s
h
e
ll, as
th
e c
o
mp
an
y'
s
en
e
m
y, k
n
ow
n a
s
a DOS attack.
The main typ
e
s of DoS att
a
cks:
1.
Con
s
um
ption
of sca
rce, limited, or non
- ren
e
wable reso
urce
s like
band
width o
r
pro
c
e
s
so
r
time
2.
De
stru
ction o
r
alteratio
n
of config
uratio
n informatio
n b
e
twee
n two
machi
n
e
s
3.
Disruptio
n of servi
c
e to a specifi
c
syste
m
or pe
rso
n
4.
Disruptio
n of routing info
rm
ation.
5.
Disruptio
n of physi
cal com
pone
nts
These th
ree
types
of attacks ag
ain
s
t flo
oding,
the
first
s
e
ns
or
w
i
re
le
ss
s
e
ns
or
ne
tw
o
r
k
,
it is important
not to have sufficient re
so
urces o
n
line.
4. Attack
s of DoS at Vari
ous Con
d
itio
ns
The sen
s
or
netwo
rks a
r
e
usually divi
ded into lay
e
rs
and laye
red a
r
chitect
u
re
WSN
vulnera
b
le to DoS attacks can
cau
s
e a
n
y
level of
the
sen
s
o
r
netwo
rk. Essay low catego
rizatio
n
ace
of
DoS attacks wa
s prop
osed by
Wo
od
a
nd Stankovic
[2].
Later, Ray
m
ond Mid
k
iff
[3]
Evaluation Warning : The document was created with Spire.PDF for Python.
ISSN: 25
02-4
752
IJEECS
Vol.
5, No. 1, Jan
uary 201
7 : 181 – 186
183
extended
poll
with
so
me
u
pdated
inform
ation. In th
i
s
article,
de
nial
of
servi
c
e
attacks is ma
de
on
sep
a
rate laye
rs an
d the po
ssi
ble counte
r
mea
s
u
r
e
s
.
4.1. Ph
y
s
ical La
y
e
r
The
physi
cal
layer is re
spo
n
si
ble fo
r the
sele
ctio
n of the
fre
quen
cy, the
ca
rri
er
freque
ncy
ge
neratio
n, si
gn
al dete
c
tion,
modulatio
n,
a
nd e
n
coding
of the d
a
ta [4
]. The n
ode
s
in
WSN can be
deploye
d
in a hostile and i
n
se
cu
re
environment in wh
ich the attacker ha
s physi
cal
acce
ss. T
w
o types of attacks o
n
the phy
sical level:
4.1.1. Jamming
This de
nial o
f
service attack, the en
em
y
tries hamp
e
r the fun
c
tio
n
ing of the n
e
twork
broa
dcastin
g
the hig
h
-e
nergy sig
nal. Even
with t
he l
e
ss p
o
werful
so
urce
s of i
n
terferen
ce, t
h
e
oppo
nent ca
n potentially
disrupt net
work
comm
u
n
icatio
n by spreadi
ng di
sturbi
ng me
ans.
Jamm
ers atta
cks can be fu
rther
cla
ssifie
d
as:
1.
Con
s
tant, wh
o harm
s
are sent to the packag
e
s
2.
More tha
n
that to send a
continu
o
u
s
st
rea
m
of bytes on to let the netwo
rk appea
r a
s
legitimate traf
fic
3.
Ran
dom, ra
n
domly altern
a
t
ing bet
we
en
slee
p distu
r
b
ance and e
n
e
r
gy
4.
Re
spo
n
sive
send
s jam sig
nal wh
en you
hear the
serv
ice
The cou
n
ter measures
to
block
a
nd sp
read
va
riation
s
on
the
com
m
unication
spectrum,
freque
ncy h
o
pping, a
nd a
s
the sp
re
adin
g
co
de. F
H
SS (FHSS) [5]
is u
s
ed fo
r hi
gh-spe
ed
sig
nals
on the ca
rri
er among ma
ny frequen
cy ch
annel
s u
s
i
ng
a pse
udo
ran
dom seque
nce kno
w
n to th
e
transmitter a
nd receiver.
Without th
e
ability to
the
seq
uen
ce
o
f
the freq
uen
cy selectio
n
An
Tra
cki
ng th
e
attacker is no
t able to
bl
ock the
u
s
ed
freque
ncy i
n
a
sna
p
shot. Sin
c
e th
e
ran
ge
of
possibl
e fre
q
uen
cie
s
is li
mited, an
attacker ma
y ja
m in pl
ace
of
the wi
de fre
quen
cy ba
nd.
The
spreadi
ng co
de has b
een
use
d
a different techni
q
u
e
to defend against attacks and disorder
is
comm
on i
n
mobile
netwo
rks. Thi
s
techniqu
e r
equi
res a
g
r
e
a
ter manufa
c
turi
n
g
complexity and
energy, whi
c
h restri
cts its
use
in th
e
WSN. In g
ene
ral, for th
e ma
intenan
ce
of l
o
w
co
st a
nd l
o
w
energy co
nsumption m
e
a
s
uri
ng d
e
vice are lim
ite
d
to the use
of a singl
e
freque
ncy,
and
therefo
r
e very sensitive to overloa
d
attacks.
4.1.2. Manipulation of
Da
ta
Senso
r
n
e
tworks usually work out.
Be
ca
u
s
e
unatte
nded
and
di
stributed
natu
r
e of WS
N
node
s a
r
e ve
ry vulnerable
to physi
cal at
tacks. [6]
Physical attacks
cau
s
e i
r
repa
rable da
mag
e
to
the no
de
s. T
he o
ppo
nent
ca
n m
anipu
late captur
ed
to obtai
n th
e en
cryptio
n
key
s
from t
he
junctio
n
of t
he
circuits,
modifying th
e prog
ram
code
s, or eve
n
re
pla
c
ed
b
y
evil sen
s
o
r
[7].
Tempe
r
co
un
ter mea
s
ures
involves tamp
eri
ng i
s
olatio
n physi
cal no
de pa
ckage t
hat exists.
1.
Self-De
s
tru
c
ti
on (tamp
e
r-proofing pa
cka
ges)
Every time someon
e a
c
ce
sses th
e phy
sical se
nsor
node
s no
de
s vapori
z
e the
conte
n
ts of
memory, and
prevent
s information lea
k
a
ge.
2.
Fault-tole
rant
protocols
- protocol
s de
sig
ned for
WSN
has to with
sta
nd su
ch a
n
attack.
4.2. The Da
ta Link La
y
e
r
4.2.1. Collision
A colli
sion
occurs
wh
en two nod
es try to tran
smit o
n
the same fre
quen
cy, at th
e sa
me
time [8]. Wh
en p
a
cket
s
collid
e, they
are
remove
d, and
the
need
for
retransmi
ssion.
The
oppo
nent ca
n strate
gicall
y lead to co
llision
s
in a
spe
c
ific
pa
ckage, such a
s
ACK
control
messages. One possi
ble c
onsequence of
these collis
ions i
s
expensive ex
ponential back-off.
An
oppo
nent co
uld
e
a
sily cra
c
k
the com
m
unication pr
ot
ocol
an
d
con
s
tantly sendi
ng me
ssag
es in
an attempt to gene
rate collision
s
. Co
u
n
ter mea
s
u
r
e
s
for colli
sio
n
s is to use error corre
c
tion
cod
e
s.
4.2.2. Exhau
s
tion
Nod
e
ha
rmfu
l disrupts M
e
dia Acce
ss
Contro
l Proto
c
ol, which
re
quire
s
contin
uou
s or
transmissio
n on
the chan
nel.
This eve
n
tually
lead
s to starvatio
n
for the oth
e
r no
de
s of
the
netwo
rk at th
e entran
c
e to
the can
a
l.
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IJEECS
ISSN:
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752
Attacks of De
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-
Servi
c
e on Net
w
orks La
yer of OS
I Model … (A
zeem
Moham
m
ed Abdul)
184
Counter meas
ures
to fatigue:
MAC re
ceive
d
sp
eed limit,
allowin
g
the
netwo
rk to i
g
nore th
e excessive dem
a
nds, thu
s
avoiding the
energy loss caused by
the
transfe
r. Usi
ng time divisi
on multiplexi
ng, whe
r
ei
n e
a
ch
node a time i
n
terval in whi
c
h it can b
e
transfe
rred ha
s been a
ssi
gn
ed.
4.2.3. Collection of Da
ta
This attacke
r
interactio
n b
e
twee
n two n
ode
s for data
transmi
ssion
.
For exampl
e, using
wirel
e
ss
LAN (IEEE 802.11)
Request to Send
(RTS
) and Clear
to Send
(CTS
). An
attacker
can
sen
d
RTS
CTS node me
ans m
e
ssa
g
e
s
re
peate
d
ly rea
c
tion
s of targete
d
re
cru
i
ting deplete
an
adja
c
ent no
d
e
.
Cou
n
term
ea
sure
s for the
colle
ction of inform
atio
n to che
ck a
gain
s
t this type of attack
node
can re
stri
ct the admissi
on of compou
nd
s of
the same i
dentity, or the use of re
p
l
a
y
prote
c
tion an
d stron
g
auth
enticatio
n co
nne
ction.
4.3. Net
w
o
r
k
La
y
e
r
4.3.1. False Rou
t
ing Info
rmation
The m
o
st
direct atta
ck ag
ainst th
e rout
ing p
r
oto
c
ol i
s
to fo
cu
s
on
the n
e
two
r
k
routing
informatio
n. An
attacke
r
can
create, modify,
or
pl
aying routing
inform
ation
to a fault in
the
netwo
rk.
The
s
e
co
ndition
s incl
ude
the
cre
a
tion
of
routing l
oop
s
attract
or re
p
e
l the
net
work
traffic of the selecte
d
nod
e
s
, lengthe
n or sho
r
t
en the
sou
r
ce path
create
s
false
e
rro
r me
ssage
s
,
allowin
g
the d
i
stributio
n net
work an
d increase laten
c
y end-to
-e
nd.
Cou
n
ter me
a
s
ures fo
r fal
s
e routing i
s
t
he MAC (Messag
e
Authentication Code) to
c
o
nnec
t
after
the report, so the rec
i
pient c
an veri
fy that the repo
rts we
re
false or altere
d. To
defend a
gain
s
t informatio
n
counte
r
s o
u
tplayed or tim
e
may be incl
uded in the re
ports.
4.3.2. Selectiv
e
Redirecti
on
In a multi-ho
p WSN net
work to
send
messag
es to
all node
s must accu
ratel
y
relay
messag
es.
An attacke
r
co
uld
comp
romi
se th
e
safety
of the
jun
c
ti
on at
ri
sk,
so
that
sele
ctively
sen
d
s me
ssa
ges to othe
r
waterfall
s
.
Cou
n
ter me
a
s
ures fo
r the sele
ctive forwardin
g
attacks are:
1.
Use multiple
paths fo
r data
transmi
ssion
.
2.
Dete
cting mal
i
ciou
s no
de o
r
assum
e
t
hat fails then try an altern
ative route.
3.
Apply implicit recognitio
n
that ensu
r
e
s
that
the packet
s
are
sent be
cau
s
e they were sent.
4.3.3. Sinkhole
The si
nkh
o
le
attack, the att
a
cker
node
compro
mise seems
attracti
ve to its neighbors to
forge
routin
g
informatio
n [9
]. The re
sult i
s
that nei
ghb
oring
nod
es
select a
nod
e
affected a
s
th
e
next hop no
d
e
route info
rmation via. This type of a
ttack is very
si
mple sele
ctive pro
g
re
ss, si
nce
all traffic from
a wide are
a
netwo
rk
will flow th
ro
ugh th
e infected no
de. Cou
n
ter
measures to the
sin
k
hol
e atta
ck is th
e G
e
o-routing
protocol
s, su
ch a
s
on
e of th
e
grou
ps, th
e routing p
r
oto
c
ol,
sin
c
e they ca
n withsta
nd a
ttacks
Sinkho
le becau
se th
eir topolo
g
y is built with th
e locali
ze
d d
a
ta
and traffic
ch
ange
s course
base
d
on th
e physi
cal lo
cation of the
sin
k
nod
e, thereby ma
kin
g
it
difficult to dra
w
elsewhere to a sump.
4.3.4. Sy
bil
Attac
k
It is an attack in whi
c
h a n
ode mo
re tha
n
one id
entity on the net
work. E '
w
a
s
o
r
iginally
descri
bed
a
s
an
attack d
e
sig
ned
to d
e
feat the
me
cha
n
ism
s
of
redu
nda
ncy t
a
rget
s in
dat
a
st
ora
ge sy
st
e
m
s
di
st
ribut
e
d
pee
r-to
-
pe
e
r
networks [10]. Author de
scribe
s thi
s
a
ttack in te
rms of
WSN. In
ad
dition u
p
to
beating
the
stora
ge, Sy
bi
l attack i
s
al
so
effective
again
s
t routi
n
g
algorith
m
s, d
a
ta aggregati
on, and votin
g
, counte
r
me
as
u
r
e
s
for Sybil attack i
s
the use of ide
n
tity
certificates.
During initiali
za
tion ago
Implementati
on of
no
des
some i
n
form
ation
se
n
s
o
r
s a
ssi
gne
d to
th
em by th
e
se
rver. The
serve
r
create
s
a
ce
rtificate
for ea
ch
nod
e whi
c
h
bind
s the i
dentity of nod
e uni
q
ue info
rmatio
n.
To demo
n
strate its node i
dentity need
to pre
s
ent the
certificate.
4.4. Transpo
r
t La
y
e
r
The two atta
cks a
r
e po
ssibl
e
on the tran
sport layer:
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752
IJEECS
Vol.
5, No. 1, Jan
uary 201
7 : 181 – 186
185
4.4.1. Flooding of Da
ta
In this p
r
oto
c
ol, in which
state hold
s
o
n
both
side
s i
n
com
m
uni
cati
on de
grade
sensitive
to memo
ry
re
sou
r
ces.
Thi
s
is due
to th
e
numbe
r
of
fal
s
e
clai
ms of
an atta
cker,
so that l
egitim
a
te
use
r
s
can n
o
t access reso
urces.
Cou
n
ter me
a
s
ures at the tran
spo
r
t layer or flooding i
s
a mystery to each ne
w no
de join
s
the netwo
rk, so that the n
ode can
co
n
n
e
ct to the net
work o
n
ly if it
solves th
e p
u
zzle. It will a
l
so
be a
limit o
n
the nu
mbe
r
o
f
con
n
e
c
tion
s that can
mai
n
tain a
no
de
at a time,
or
a me
cha
n
ism
to
remove
all trace
s
, but it'
s
hard sen
s
or netwo
rks th
rough
re
stri
ctions
su
dde
n unavailability
of
some n
ode
s
due to their fa
ilure.
4.4.2. De- Sy
nchroni
zatio
n
of Da
ta
In
this oppo
nent
p
a
ro
die
s
repe
ated messag
e
to the
termi
nal node
s and e
nd
n
ode
s
requi
re falter
retra
n
smi
s
sio
n
. So, your oppon
ent
can
force le
gitima
te end node
s continue to try
to co
rre
ct e
rro
rs
that d
o
not
really
exist losses. Counter
m
easure
s
aga
inst
the attack
authenti
c
atio
n pa
ckets be
fore they
are
delivered to
the terminal
nod
es if the
y
belon
g to
an
authori
z
e
d
user or n
o
t
4.5. Application La
y
e
r of
OSI
4.5.1. Path-b
ased DoS
In this
adversary i
n
je
cts
p
a
ckets flood
played e
nd t
o
en
d comm
unication b
e
twee
n two
node
s, each node on the
path to the bas
e
station forwa
r
d
s
the pa
cket,
but if
they are se
nt large
amount
s of fa
ke p
a
cket
s wi
ll all be o
c
cu
pied. Th
us, th
is attack
will
con
s
um
e ba
n
d
width, a
nd t
he
energy of nod
es [11].
4.5.2. Repro
g
ramming Atta
ck
Program you
r
mind to
re
prog
ram
may
be du
e to t
he net
work
n
ode
s to the
relea
s
e,
cha
nge old
prog
ram u
p
g
r
ade, o
r
for any other pu
rpo
s
e net
wo
rk mana
gem
e
n
t [12]. If this
rep
r
og
rammi
ng p
r
o
c
ess i
s
safe, the a
ttacke
r
can t
a
ke
co
ntrol
o
f
a larg
e pa
rt
of the net
work.
Cou
n
ter mea
s
ures for atta
cks
on
the
a
pplication
l
a
yer th
e b
e
st
a
u
thentication
method
or an
ti-
rep
r
od
uctio
n
DoS attack at
different
levels and p
o
ssibl
e
cou
n
ter me
asu
r
e
s
.
5. Conclusio
n
Safety plays a ce
ntral role
in the imple
m
entat
ion
of wirel
e
ss sen
s
or networks.
In
this
article,
we
ha
ve to attack t
he n
e
two
r
k of
se
nsor
s,
wireless,
cla
ssifi
ed e
a
ch laye
r of the
TCP /
IP.
The attacks,
the plot ag
ainst the m
e
asu
r
e
s
, so
t
hat the wi
rel
e
ss sen
s
or
netwo
rk
of h
i
ghly
respe
c
ted, that is the nature
of the attack, be
ca
use preventio
n
is better than cu
re. Sen
s
o
r
netwo
rks a
r
e
threaten
ed a
ttacks on the
physical lev
e
l,
like all other layers of denial. All levels,
except for th
e natural, very difficult not determi
ne the attac
k
or the intent. Finally DoS attack
s
effective at e
v
ery level, so
a spe
c
ial e
m
pha
si
s on
reaching
prev
ention. Se
curity, and plays an
importa
nt rol
e
in the impl
ementation
o
f
wirele
ss
se
nso
r
net
works. In this arti
cle, we
have
to
attack
the ne
twork
of se
nsors, wi
rele
ss,
cla
s
sifi
ed
ea
ch l
a
yer
of th
e TCP
/ IP. The atta
cks, th
e
plot again
s
t the mea
s
u
r
e
s
, so that the wirel
e
ss
se
n
s
or net
work of
highly re
spe
c
ted, that is t
he
nature
of the
attack, b
e
ca
use
preve
n
tio
n
is
b
e
tter th
an cure. Se
n
s
or networks are th
reate
n
e
d
attacks on the physi
cal lev
e
l, like
all oth
e
r laye
rs of d
enial. All le
vels, exce
pt for
the natural, very
difficult not determin
e
the attack o
r
the intent. Fina
lly DoS attacks
effective at every level, so that
woul
d identify a particul
a
r a
ttention and p
r
evention.
Referen
ces
[1]
Den
g
J, Han
R an
d Mishra
S.
Defending against Path-
based
DoS At
tacks in Wireless Sens
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orks
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05, Ale
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ia,
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W
ang Q, Z
h
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hen
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e
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m
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ks: Attacks and Def
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IEEE Pervasiv
e Com
p
uting.
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008: 74-
81.
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IJEECS
ISSN:
2502-4
752
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nial-of
-
Servi
c
e on Net
w
orks La
yer of OS
I Model … (A
zeem
Moham
m
ed Abdul)
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r
appe
W
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hang Y an
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ood T
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a
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a
n
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i
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o
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i
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